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Abstract
We study the power and limits of optimal dynamic pricing in combinatorial markets; i.e.,
dynamic pricing that leads to optimal social welfare. Previous work by Cohen-Addad et al.
[EC’16] demonstrated the existence of optimal dynamic prices for unit-demand buyers, and
showed a market with coverage valuations that admits no such prices. However, finding the
frontier of markets (i.e., valuation functions) that admit optimal dynamic prices remains an open
problem. In this work we establish positive and negative results that narrow the existing gap.
On the positive side, we provide tools for handling markets beyond unit-demand valuations. In
particular, we characterize all optimal allocations in multi-demand markets. This characterization
allows us to partition the items into equivalence classes according to the role they play in achieving
optimality. Using these tools, we provide a poly-time optimal dynamic pricing algorithm for up
to 3 multi-demand buyers.
On the negative side, we establish a maximal domain theorem, showing that for every non-
gross substitutes valuation, there exist unit-demand valuations such that adding them yields a
market that does not admit an optimal dynamic pricing. This result is reminiscent of the seminal
maximal domain theorem by Gul and Stacchetti [JET’99] for Walrasian equilibrium. Yang
[JET’17] discovered an error in their original proof, and established a different, incomparable
version of their maximal domain theorem. En route to our maximal domain theorem for optimal
dynamic pricing, we provide the first complete proof of the original theorem by Gul and Stacchetti.
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1 Introduction
We study the power and limitations of (anonymous) pricing schemes in achieving optimal social
welfare in combinatorial markets. We consider combinatorial markets with m heterogeneous,
indivisible goods, and n buyers with (publicly known) complex, idiosyncratic preferences over
bundles of items. In the most general form, every buyer has a monotone valuation function
vi ∶ 2[m] → R≥0, which assigns a real (non-negative) value to every bundle, and the goal is to allocate
items to buyers in a way that maximizes the social welfare; i.e., the sum of buyer values.
If only computational constraints are taken into account, a welfare maximizing allocation can
be efficiently computed in the full information setting whenever the buyers exhibit preferences as
simple as gross-substitutes [34]. Moreover, the celebrated VCG mechanism [38, 7, 25] achieves this
even in strategic settings. Real world markets, however, usually employ simpler mechanisms, such
as pricing, and understanding their performance is of great interest.
To this end, we study the welfare maximization problem by means of an anonymous pricing
scheme. Apart from being simple, pricing schemes are attractive since they lack an all powerful
central authority. Once the prices are set, the buyers arrive and simply choose a desired set of items
from the available inventory. This procedure is quite prevalent in market scenarios.
Formally, the seller sets items prices p = (p1, . . . , pm) ∈ Rm≥0, buyers arrive sequentially (in an
arbitrary order), and every buyer chooses a bundle T (from the remaining items) that maximizes
the (quasi-linear) utility: ui(T,p) = vi(T ) −∑j∈T pj , breaking ties arbitrarily.
Maximizing welfare by pricing is challenging even for relatively simple valuations and even when
the seller has full knowledge of the valuation profile, due to the large degree of freedom it leaves to
the buyers. A reader familiar with the fundamental notion of Walrasian equilibrium, which dates
back to the 19th century [39] (also known as market/pricing/competitive equilibrium), may conclude
that the problem is solved for any market that admits a Walrasian equilibrium. A Walrasian
equilibrium is a pair of an allocation S = (S1, . . . , Sn) and prices p = (p1, . . . , pm), such that for every
buyer i, Si maximizes i’s utility given p. By the first welfare theorem , every Walrasian equilibrium
maximizes social welfare.
Are Walrasian prices a solution to our problem? The answer, as was previously observed [10, 28],
is no. Walrasian prices alone cannot resolve a market without coordinating the tie breaking. If
a buyer is faced with multiple utility-maximizing bundles, it is crucial that a central authority
coordinate the tie breaking in accordance with the corresponding optimal allocation. In real-world
markets, however, buyers are only faced with the prices and choose a desired bundle by themselves
without caring about global efficiency. [10] demonstrated that lacking a tie-breaking coordinator,
Walrasian pricing can lead to an arbitrarily bad allocation. Moreover, they showed that no pricing
whatsoever can achieve more than 2/3 of the optimal social welfare in the worst case, even when
restricted to unit-demand buyers (where every buyer has value for every item, and the value for a
set is the maximum value of any item in the set).
In order to circumvent this state of affairs, [10] propose a more powerful pricing scheme, namely
dynamic pricing, where the seller dynamically updates prices in between buyer arrivals (based on
the remaining buyers and the current inventory).
Consider the following example, given by [10], for a market that has no optimal static pricing
but does have an optimal dynamic pricing.
Example 1. The market consists of 3 unit-demand buyers Alice, Bob and Carl, and three items
a, b, c. Alice has value 1 for a, b and 0 for c, Bob has value 1 for b, c and 0 for a, and Carl has value
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1 for a, c and 0 for b. Consider the initial prices pa = pb = pc = 12 . Since the market is symmetric, we
can assume w.l.o.g. that Alice comes first. At these prices she takes either a or b, and let’s assume
(again w.l.o.g.) that she takes a. In the second round, the seller can price b at 14 and c at
1
2 . If
Bob arrives next then he takes b, and if Carl arrives next then he takes c. The remaining item can
then be priced at 0 to guarantee that it is taken by the last buyer. In any case, social welfare is
maximized.
For a given valuation class C, the existence of an optimal dynamic pricing reduces to the
existence of an adequate initial price vector. If there always is an initial price vector guaranteeing
that regardless of the identity of the first buyer, and regardless of how she breaks ties, the bundle
she consumes can always be completed to an optimal allocation, then some optimal allocation can
always be achieved, by induction. The following definition of optimal dynamic pricing follows (the
formal definition appears as Definition 2.1):
Definition. A price vector p is an optimal dynamic pricing (hereafter, dynamic pricing) if for
every buyer i, and every utility-maximizing bundle T for i (given p), T is allocated to i in some
optimal allocation.
Due to the first welfare theorem, Walrasian pricing can be defined in the following way, which
closely resembles the definition of dynamic pricing:
Definition. A price vector p is a Walrasian pricing if there is an optimal allocation S = (S1, . . . , Sn)
such that Si maximizes i’s utility (given p) for every buyer i.
Despite the similarity between the two definitions, they are incomparable. [10] provide an
example of a market with coverage valuations that has a Walrasian pricing but not a dynamic
pricing. For the converse direction, we borrow from [20] an example of a market that has no
Walrasian pricing, and show that it does admit a dynamic pricing (see section 6).
What is known about the existence of these two pricing notions? For Walrasian pricing we know
much. Kelso and Crawford [30] prove that every gross-substitutes market (a strict super-set of
unit-demand, and a strict subset of submodular) admits a Walrasian pricing. Moreover, Gul and
Stacchetti [26] show that this result is tight in the following sense:
Theorem 1.1 (Maximal Domain Theorem for Walrasian Equilibrium [26]). Let v1 be a non gross-
substitutes valuation. Then, there exist unit-demand valuations v2, . . . , v` for some ` such that the
valuation profile (v1, v2, . . . , v`) does not admit a Walrasian equilibrium1.
The combination of these results completely characterizes the existence of Walrasian pricing for
classes of valuations that contain unit-demand valuations.
For dynamic pricing, however, the picture is significantly less clear. [10] show that unit-demand
markets always admit dynamic prices. Moreover, their result extends to gross-substitutes markets
in which there is a unique optimal allocation. For markets without unique optimum, no positive
result beyond unit-demand buyers is known. On the negative end, the state of affairs is even worse;
we only know of the coverage valuations example mentioned above, which does not admit a dynamic
pricing. The following natural question arises:
What markets (i.e., what valuation classes) can be resolved optimally using dynamic
pricing schemes?
1Yang [40] discovered an error in the proof; details to follow.
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1.1 Our Results
In this work we shrink the gap between possibility and impossibility guarantees for optimal dynamic
pricing, from both ends.
Positive Results. A natural extension of unit-demand valuations is multi-demand valuations,
where every buyer i has a cap (a.k.a demand) ki on the number of desired items, and the value for
a set is the sum of the values for the ki most valued items in the set. Our main positive result is
the following:
Theorem 1.2. Every market with up to 3 multi-demand buyers admits a dynamic pricing. Moreover,
the prices can be computed in polynomial (in the number of items m) time, using value queries2.
A major component in the analysis is the following theorem that characterizes the set of optimal
allocations in multi-demand markets (with any number of buyers, and any demand vector). For
the sake of simplicity, we present the theorem for markets in which all items are allocated in
every optimal allocation, and in which the total demand of the players equals supply (however, an
analogous result holds also for the case where demand exceeds supply, see Appendix B).
Theorem (Optimal Allocation Characterization). (Informal) In a market with n multi-demand
buyers, an allocation A is optimal if and only if the following hold:
• The number of items that each buyer receives equals that buyer’s demand.
• If item x is allocated to buyer i, then there is an optimal allocation where x is allocated to i.
In addition to extending the result of [10] beyond unit-demand buyers, we also contribute to the
domain of unit-demand buyers. In the pricing scheme proposed by [10] buyers may have to break
ties. In section 4 we propose an alternative scheme for unit-demand buyers, where tie breaking is
eliminated altogether.
Theorem 1.3. Every market with unit-demand buyers admits a dynamic pricing scheme where
every buyer has a unique utility-maximizing bundle at every stage of the procedure.
Negative Results. In 2017, Yang [40] discovered an error in the proof of the maximal domain
theorem for Walrasian equilibrium by Gul and Stacchetti. Unfortunately, the error is not in the
analysis of the construction, rather in the construction itself. Indeed, Yang showed an instance of
their constructed market that does admit a Walrasian equilibrium. In the same work he proved
an alternative, incomparable theorem: for every non gross-substitutes valuation there is a (single)
gross-substitutes valuation for which the obtained market has no Walrasian equilibrium. Yang’s
theorem is stronger, in the sense that only a single valuation is added to guarantee the non-existence
of Walrasian equilibrium. On the other hand, Gul and Stacchetti’s theorem is stronger in the sense
that the added valuations have the simple structure of unit-demand valuations. In section 5 we
provide a complete proof of the maximal domain theorem as it was originally stated. The proof is a
major component in our main negative result, a maximal domain theorem for dynamic pricing:
Theorem 1.4. Let v1 be a non gross-substitutes valuation. Then, there are unit-demand valuations
v2, . . . , v` for some ` such that the valuation profile (v1, v2, . . . , v`) does not admit a dynamic pricing.
2A value query for a valuation v receives a set S as input, and returns v(S), see Section 2.
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While this result is analogous to the theorem by Gul and Stacchetti, we emphasize that the
notions of dynamic pricing and Walrasian pricing are incomparable, and thus none of the maximal
domain theorems directly implies the other.
1.2 Our Techniques
Techniques for Positive Results. Our starting point is the dynamic pricing scheme of [10] for
unit-demand buyers. In a nutshell, their scheme computes an optimal allocation X = (x1, . . . , xn)
(the item xi is allocated to buyer i) and then constructs a complete, weighted directed graph in
which the vertices are the items. An edge xi → xj in this graph represents a preference constraint,
requiring that buyer i strongly prefer the item xi over xj , relative to the output prices. Hereafter,
we term this graph the “preference graph”.
The best we could hope for is to compute prices relative to which all edge constraints are satisfied.
In this case, all buyers would strongly prefer their items over the rest, and the allocation obtained
after the last buyer leaves the market would be X. Consequently, this would imply an optimal static
pricing scheme for unit-demand buyers, which is impossible. However, [10] prove the following two
claims:
• An edge xi → xj participates in a 0-weight cycle iff there is an alternative optimal allocation
in which xj is allocated to buyer i.
• If 0-weight cycles are removed from the graph, then one can compute prices that satisfy the
remaining edge constraints.
Thus, the scheme removes every edge that participates in a 0-weight cycle, and then computes
the prices as per the second bullet above. Relative to these prices, every buyer strongly prefers her
allocated item to every other item, except (perhaps) for the set of items that are allocated to her in
some alternative optimal allocation. Since every buyer takes at most one favorite item (the buyers
are unit-demand), this property guarantees that allocating this item to the buyer is consistent with
an optimal allocation (not necessarily X), as desired.
A similar approach can be taken in the multi-demand setting as well. Indeed, the same techniques
can be adapted to output prices, relative to which every buyer strongly prefers each of her allocated
items to every other item, except perhaps for those that are allocated to her in some alternative
optimal allocation. However, this property is not sufficient to ensure optimal welfare for multi-
demand buyers, where a buyer may take more than one item. To get intuition for what may go
wrong, note that the fact that item x is allocated to buyer i in some optimal allocation and also
item y is allocated to i in some optimal allocation does not imply that there exists a single optimal
allocation where both x and y are allocated to i. This problem is demonstrated in the following
running example, which generalizes the example by [10] above.
Running Example. Consider a market with 5 items a, b, c, d, e and 3 buyers, 1, 2, 3. Buyers 1
and 2 are both 2-demand, and buyer 3 is unit-demand. Buyer 1 values a, b, c, d at 1 and e at 0,
Buyer 2 values c, d, e at 1 and a, b at 0, and buyer 3 values a, b, e at 1 and c, d at 0. One can verify
that allocating a, b to 1, c, d to 2 and e to 3 maximizes social welfare. Moreover, both c and d are
allocated to 1 in alternative optimal allocations (different ones). However, if 1 takes both c and d,
then the resulting social welfare can be at most 4, while OPT = 5.
This example demonstrates that removing every edge that participates in a 0-weight cycle from
the preference graph might lead to a sub-optimal allocation. Our challenge is to remove enough
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edges so that on the one hand, all 0-weight cycles are eliminated (this will enable us to compute the
prices), and on the other hand, every deviation from X implied by the edge removals is consistent
with some alternative optimal allocation.
Our first step is to gain a better structural understanding of optimal allocations in multi-demand
markets. This is cast in the optimal allocation characterization theorem above, which essentially says
that an allocation is optimal iff every item is allocated to a buyer that receives it in some optimal
allocation. This simple characterization is quite powerful and leads to a significant simplification of
the problem: For the sake of optimizing social welfare, the concrete values of the buyers for any
specific item are unimportant. The important feature of any item is the set of buyers that receive
it in some optimal allocation. Two items are essentially equivalent if their corresponding sets of
buyers coincide. This observation allows us to group items into equivalence classes, providing a
compact view of the market. For example, in markets with up to 3 multi-demand buyers, there are
at most 8 (non-empty) equivalence classes, while the total number of items can be arbitrarily large.
Equipped with this new view of the market, we construct a new directed graph, termed the
“item-equivalence graph”, which abstracts away the irrelevant information encoded in the preference
graph. The vertices are these equivalence classes (refined after intersecting them with the bundles
from the initial optimal allocation X), and there is an edge C → D whenever the buyer to which
the items in C are allocated (in the allocation X) also receives every item in D in some alternative
optimal allocation. We prove that there is a correspondence between cycles in the item-equivalence
graph and 0-weight cycles in the preference graph. Thus our challenge is reduced to removing enough
edges from the first (and translate these removals back to the second), in a way that eliminates all
cycles, but also guarantees the following: every deviation by any buyer from her prescribed bundle,
implied by the edge removals, allows the other buyers to simultaneously compensate for their “stolen”
items by replacing them with items from other relevant equivalence classes. The optimal allocation
characterization theorem will then guarantee that the obtained allocation is indeed optimal. We
devise an edge-removal method satisfying these requirements whenever the number of buyers is at
most 3.
The optimal allocation characterization theorem and the item equivalence graph may be of
independent interest, and may prove useful in the context of other problems related to multi-demand
markets.
Techniques for Negative Results. The starting point for our negative results is the following
simple observation: If a valuation profile admits a unique optimal allocation, then any dynamic
pricing is also a Walrasian pricing. Thus, for the sake of proving our maximal domain theorem for
dynamic pricing, it suffices to modify the construction given by Gul and Stacchetti in their theorem
for Walrasian equilibrium in a way that preserves the correctness of the proof, but also guarantees a
unique optimal allocation for the construction.
In their proof, Gul and Stacchetti characterized gross-substitutes as the class of valuations that
exhibit the single improvement property:
Theorem ([26]). A valuation v is gross-substitutes if and only if for any bundle A and price vector p
such that A is not utility-maximizing relative to p, there is a bundle B such that ∣A ∖B∣ , ∣B ∖A∣ ≤ 1
and u(A,p) < u(B,p).
This characterization is used to claim the existence of some bundle A and item prices p, relative
to which A is not utility maximizing for v1 (v1 is the assumed non gross-substitutes valuation), and
any preferred bundle B satisfies ∣B ∖A∣ ≥ 2 or ∣A ∖B∣ ≥ 2. The proof then considers such a bundle
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B minimizing ∣A△B∣, and splits to cases according to whether ∣B ∖A∣ ≥ 2 or ∣A ∖B∣ ≥ 2. Suitable
unit-demand valuations are then constructed for each case.
In the first case (∣B ∖A∣ ≥ 2), we could not manage to modify the construction so as to guarantee
uniqueness of the optimal allocation. However, we did manage to perturb the valuations just enough
so that every dynamic pricing can be converted to a Walrasian pricing, while maintaining the
correctness of the construction (i.e., the construction does not admit a Walrasian pricing).
As for the second case in their proof, Yang [40] discovered a counter-example for the construction.
In section 5.1, we harness a new characterization of gross-substitutes to prove that if v1 is not
gross-substitutes, then one can always find p and A for which the corresponding minimizer B
satisfies ∣B ∖A∣ ≥ 2. Therefore, only the first case in the original proof had to be considered in
the first place, and we obtain both maximal domain theorems (for Walraian pricing and dynamic
pricing) simultaneously. This new characterization is a variant of the price-based characterization
by Reijnierse et al. [35] in which the item prices are guaranteed to be non-negative (in contrast to
the item prices in [35]).
Open problems. Our results suggest questions for future research. The most obvious one is
whether our positive result for 3 multi-demand buyers can be extended to any number of buyers.
We hope that the tools we develop in this work, including the optimal allocation characterization
theorem and the item equivalence graph, which are applicable to multi-demand markets of any size,
will prove useful in this extension.
More generally, it is still open whether any market with gross substitutes valuations admits an
optimal dynamic pricing.
1.3 Related Work
The notion of Walrasian equilibrium was defined for divisible-goods as early as the 19th century [39].
This notion was later extended to combinatorial markets, where Kelso and Crawford [30] introduced
the class of gross-substitutes valuations as a class for which a natural ascending auction reaches a
Walrasian equilibrium. Gul and Stacchetti later showed via their maximal domain theorem that
gross-substitutes is the frontier of this existence result [26, 40]. Gross-substitutes valuations have been
introduced independently in different fields, under different names, and under seemingly different
definitions [11, 12, 13, 33]; see [31] for a comprehensive survey of gross-substitutes valuations. In order
to circumvent the non-existence of a market equilibrium under broader valuation classes, relaxations
of market equilibrium were introduced [22, 15], and behavioral biases were harnessed [3, 19].
Posted price mechanisms were shown to be useful in combinatorial markets. Feldman, Gravin
and Lucier [21] showed how to compute simple “balanced” static prices in order to obtain at least
half of the optimal welfare for submodular valuations, even in the case where the seller has only
Bayesian knowledge about the valuations. This idea was generalized by Duetting et al. [14], and
was shown to be useful even in the face of complementarities between items [6].
Cohen-Addad et al. [10] and Hsu et al. [28] were the first to demonstrate that Walrasian prices
cannot even approximate the optimal welfare in the absence of a centralized tie-breaking coordinator.
Cohen-Addad et al. resolved this issue by adjusting prices dynamically for unit-demand valuations.
They also showed an instance of coverage valuations where a Walrasian equilibrium exists and yet
dynamic prices cannot guarantee optimal welfare. On the other hand, Hsu et al. showed that under
some conditions, minimal Walrasian prices guarantee near-optimal welfare for a strict subclass of
8
gross-substitutes valuations3. Ezra et al. [18] and Eden et al. [17] established better guarantees
via static pricing for simpler markets (identical items and binary unit-demand, respectively), in
comparison to [21].
Posted price mechanisms have been shown to be useful in additional settings with different
objective functions, including revenue maximization in combinatorial markets [27, 4, 5, 1], cost
minimization in online scheduling [23, 16, 29], and a variety of other online resource allocation
problems [8, 9, 24, 2].
2 Preliminaries
We consider a setting with a finite set of indivisible items M (with m ∶= ∣M ∣) and a set of n buyers (or
players). Every buyer has a valuation function v ∶ 2M → R≥0. As standard, we assume monotonicity
and normalization of all valuations, i.e. v(S) ≤ v(T ) whenever S ⊆ T , and v(∅) = 0. A valuation
profile of n buyers is denoted v = (v1, . . . , vn) and we assume that it is known by all. An allocation
is a vector A = (A1, . . . ,An) of disjoint subsets of M , indicating the bundles of items given to
each player (not all items have to be allocated). The social welfare of an allocation A is given by
SW(A) = ∑ni=1 vi(Ai). An optimal allocation is an allocation that achieves the maximum social
welfare among all allocations.
A pricing or a price vector is a vector p ∈ Rn≥0 indicating the price of each item. We assume a
quasi-linear utility, i.e. the utility of a buyer i from a bundle S ⊆M given prices p is ui(S,p) =
vi(S)−∑x∈S px. The demand correspondence of buyer i given p is the collection of utility maximizing
bundles Dp(v) ∶= arg maxS⊆M{u(S,p)}.
2.1 Dynamic Pricing
In the dynamic pricing problem buyers arrive to the market in an arbitrary and unknown order.
Before every buyer arrival new prices are set to the items that are still available. The arriving buyer
then chooses an arbitrary utility-maximizing bundle based on the current prices and available items.
The goal is to set the prices so that for any arrival order and any tie breaking choices by the buyers,
the obtained social welfare is optimal. We are interested in proving the guaranteed existence of
an optimal dynamic pricing for any market composed entirely of buyers from a given valuation
class C. It can be easily shown by induction that the problem is reduced to proving the guaranteed
existence of item prices p such that any utility-maximizing bundle of any buyer can be completed
to an optimal allocation. In other words, we can rephrase the dynamic pricing problem as follows:
Definition 2.1. An optimal dynamic pricing (hereafter, dynamic pricing) for the buyer profile
v = (v1, . . . , vn) is a price vector p ∈ Rm≥0 such that for any buyer i and any S ∈ Dp(vi) there is an
optimal allocation O in which player i receives S.
In the case that a dynamic pricing exists, we will also be interested in efficiently computing it.
We assume access to the valuation function of every buyer i through a value oracle, namely, given a
set S ⊆M the oracle returns vi(S).
Definition 2.2. A poly-time dynamic pricing scheme is a poly(m,n)-time algorithm that computes
a dynamic pricing given access to the valuation profile through value oracles.
3Tran [37] recently showed that the class of matroid-based valuation is a strict subclass of gross-substitutes
valuations.
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2.2 Valuation Classes
This paper considers the following valuation classes:
• Unit-Demand Valuations: A valuation v ∶ 2M → R≥0 is unit-demand if for all S ⊆ M ,
v(S) = maxx∈S{v({x})}.
• Gross-Substitutes Valuations[30] A valuation v ∶ 2M → R≥0 is gross-substitutes if for any
two price vectors p,q such that p ≤ q (point-wise), and for any A ∈Dp(v) there is a bundle
B ∈Dq(v) such that A ∩ {x ∈M ∣ px = qx} ⊆ B.
• Multi-Demand Valuations: A valuation v ∶ 2M → R≥0 is k-demand if for all S ⊆ M ,
v(S) = maxS′⊆S ∶ ∣S′∣ ≤ k{∑x∈S′ v(x)}.
Note that for k = 1 we obtain a unit-demand valuation. Furthermore, every multi-demand
valuation is gross-substitutes.
3 Dynamic Pricing for Multi-Demand Buyers
In this section we prove Theorem 1.2, namely we establish a poly(m) dynamic pricing scheme for
n = 3 multi-demand buyers. As we shall see most of the tools we use hold for any number of buyers
n. For this entire section we fix a multi-demand buyer profile v = (v1, . . . , vn) over the item set M ,
where each vi is ki-demand. We assume w.l.o.g. that all items are essential for optimality (i.e. all
items are allocated in every optimal allocation) since otherwise we can price all unnecessary items
at ∞ in every round to ensure that no player takes any of them (and price the rest of the items as if
the unnecessary items do not exist). Note that under this assumption, each optimal allocation gives
buyer i at most ki items, for every i. In particular we have m ≤ ∑ni=1 ki. For the sake of simplicity
we further assume for the rest of this section that every optimal allocation gives each buyer i exactly
ki items, and thus m = ∑ni=1 ki. The case m < ∑ki introduces substantial technical difficulty and we
defer its treatment to Appendix B. In section 3.1 we go over the tools used in our dynamic pricing
scheme. In section 3.2 we present the dynamic pricing scheme for n = 3 buyers.
3.1 Tools and Previous Solutions
In section 3.1.1 we present the main combinatorial construct of our solution, namely the preference-
graph, which generalizes the construct given by [10] in their solution for unit-demand buyers. In
section 3.1.2 we explain the obstacles for generalizing the approach of [10] to the multi-demand
setting. Finally, in sections 3.1.3 and 3.1.4 we develop the necessary machinery needed to overcome
these obstacles. All the tools we develop and their properties hold for any number of buyers n.
3.1.1 The Preference Graph and an Initial Pricing Attempt
Let O be an arbitrary optimal allocation. The preference graph based on O is the directed graph
H whose vertices are the items in M . Furthermore there is a special ‘source’ vertex denoted s.
For any two different players i, j and items x ∈ Oi, y ∈ Oj we have a directed edge e = x → y with
weight w(e) = vi(x) − vi(y). We also have a 0-weight edge s → x for every item x ∈M . Since an
optimal allocation can be computed in poly(n,m) time with value queries (the valuations are gross
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substitutes, see [31]), it follows that the preference graph can also be computed in poly(n,m) time
with value queries. When ∣Oi∣ = 1 for every i, the graph is exactly the one introduced by [10] in their
unit-demand solution. We remark that a similar graph structure has been used by Murota in order
to compute Walrasian equilibria in gross-substitutes markets ([32]). The proofs of the following two
claims and corollary are deferred to Appendix A.
Claim 3.1. Let C ∶= x1 → x2 → ⋯xk → x1 be a cycle in H, where xi is allocated to player i in O
and xi ≠ xj for every i ≠ j. Then the weight of the cycle is w(C) = SW(O)− SW(A) where A is the
allocation obtained from O by transferring xi+1 to player i for every i (we identify player k + 1 with
player 1).
Corollary 3.2. Every cycle in H has non-negative weight.
Corollary 3.2 implies that the weight of the min-weight path from s to x, denoted δ(s, x), is
well-defined for any item x.
Claim 3.3. Let px ∶= −δ(s, x) for every item x. Let i be some player, and let x, y be items such
that x ∈ Oi, y ∉ Oi. Then:
1. px ≥ 0.
2. vi(x) − px ≥ vi(y) − py.
3. vi(x) − px ≥ 0.
Note that the utility player i obtains from any bundle of size at most ki is the sum of the
individual utilities obtained by the individual items. That is, for any S = {s1, . . . , st} ⊆M, t ≤ ki
and prices p we have ui(S,p) = ∑tj=1 vi(sj) − pj . Thus, Claim 3.3 shows that setting the prices
px = −δ(s, x) almost achieves the requirements of dynamic pricing. The prices are non-negative as
required and any player i is maximally happy by taking the designated bundle Oi upon arriving first
to the market. However, since the inequalities in Claim 3.3 are not strict, the incoming player might
deviate from the designated bundle. If the price of some real item is 0, then nothing prevents the
incoming player from taking it, irrespective of whether she already achieved her demand through
other items. Furthermore, if vi(x) − px = vi(y) − py, then player i might take y instead of x. Finally,
if vi(x) − px = 0, then player i might choose not to take x. All of these deviations might lead to a
sub-optimal allocation.
To illustrate, consider a simple example of a market composed of two unit-demand buyers and
two items, each of which is valued at 1 by both buyers. There are two optimal allocations here (each
allocating one item to each player) inducing a social welfare of 2. It is easy to see that the resulting
preference graph has only 0-weight edges, implying a price of 0 to both items. This in turn implies
that every non-empty bundle is demanded by both buyers and in particular the first incoming buyer
might take both items, resulting in a partial allocation that cannot be completed to an optimal one.
If we could decrease the weight of all edges by some small enough constant ε, then we would get
a strong inequality in parts (2) and (3) of Claim 3.3, guaranteeing that player i’s most preferable
items are Oi and that she takes no less than ki items when arriving first. The item prices could
then be increased by another tiny constant so as to also satisfy part (1) with strong inequality,
guaranteeing that she also takes no more than ki items, hereby establishing that the only bundle in
her demand is Oi. However, decreasing edge weights can introduce cycles of negative weight in H,
in which case the min-weight path from s to x is not defined for any x in such a cycle!
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Figure 1: Two 0-weight cycles in the preference graph constructed in the running example. Removing
the two cycles could result in buyer 1 taking c and d instead of a and b, leaving buyer 2 with only
one item that gives positive value. The thin red, thick blue and dashed green arrows correspond to
the constraints of buyers 1,2,3 respectively.
3.1.2 Solution for Unit-Demand Valuations and its Failure to Generalize
The approach taken in [10] to solve this issue in the setting of unit-demand players (where ∣Oi∣ = 1
for every i) is to remove every edge that participates in a 0-weight cycle in H (thus leaving only
positive weight cycles, by Corollary 3.2) and then decrease the remaining edge weights by a small
enough  so that all leftover cycles still have positive weight. Removing an edge x→ y for x ∈ Oi,
y ∉ Oi cancels the preference guarantee of Claim 3.3 (part 2), leading to a possible deviation by
buyer i from taking x to taking y. However, since 0-weight cycles correspond to alternative optimal
allocations (see Claim 3.1 with w(C) = 0), then this is not a problem: if the edge x→ y was removed,
then there is an optimal allocation in which player i receives y instead of x. As for the edges x→ y
that were not removed, the  decrement causes i to strongly prefer x over y. The other inequalities
of Claim 3.3 would also be strict, and we are thus guaranteed that the incoming player indeed
takes a one-item bundle that is part of some optimal allocation, as desired. This approach works in
the unit-demand setting, but poses problems in our setting, as illustrated in the running example
(presented in the introduction).
[Running Example] Figure 1 shows two 0-weight cycles in the preference graph (out of the four
existing 0-weight cycles) based on the initial optimal allocation that gives buyer 1 {a, b}, buyer 2{c, d} and buyer 3 {e}. If all such cycles are removed, then nothing prevents 1 from taking items
c and d instead of a and b. At this point buyer 2 has only the item e to compensate for the two
“stolen” items c and d. It follows that the partial allocation cannot be completed to an optimal one.
Item e in the running example is in some sense a “bottleneck” in the preference graph, and
a more sophisticated method of eliminating 0-weight cycles must be employed instead of simply
removing all edges that participate in some 0-weight cycle. To be more precise, we state our informal
goal:
Goal. Remove a set of edges from the preference graph so that no 0-weight cycles are left, and
every possible deviation implied by the removed edges is consistent with some optimal allocation.
In order to gain a better understanding of the tolerable deviations from the designated bundles
Oi, we first characterize the structure of the collection of optimal allocations.
3.1.3 Legal Allocations
Definition 3.4.
• An item x ∈M is legal for player i if there is some optimal allocation O = (O1, . . . ,On) such
that x ∈ Oi.
• A bundle S ⊆M is legal for player i if ∣S∣ = ki and every x ∈ S is legal for player i.
• A legal allocation A = (A1, . . . ,An) is an allocation in which Ai is legal for player i, for every
i.
In a legal allocation every player i receives exactly ki items, each of which is allocated to her in
some optimal allocation. Note that a legal bundle for buyer i might not form a part of any optimal
allocation (e.g., the bundle {c, d} for buyer 1 in the running example). The following theorem
provides a characterization of the collection of optimal allocations.
Theorem 3.5. An allocation is legal if and only if it is optimal.
Before proving Theorem 3.5, we state a corollary of it. Recall that a price vector p is a dynamic
pricing iff for any i and S ∈ Dp(vi) there is an optimal allocation O in which player i receives S.
The following is a direct corollary of Theorem 3.5:
Corollary 3.6. A price vector p is a dynamic pricing if for every player i and S ∈Dp(i), S is legal
for player i and there exists an allocation of the items M ∖ S to the other players in which every
player receives a bundle that is legal for her.
Thus, going back to our informal Goal (see section 3.1.2), Theorem 3.5 determines the deviations
from the bundles Oi which are tolerable. A buyer can only deviate to items that are legal for her,
in a way that the leftover items can be partitioned “legally” among the rest of the buyers. We now
prove Theorem 3.5.
Proof. Legality follows from optimality due to our assumption that every optimal allocation allocates
exactly ki items to every player i. For the other direction we first prove the theorem in the special
case of a unit-demand market, i.e. ki = 1 for every player i, and then we show how the general case
reduces to the unit-demand market case.
Lemma 3.7. If ki = 1 for all i then any legal allocation is optimal.
Proof. Let L = ({`1}, . . . ,{`n}) be a legal allocation, and let O = ({o1}, . . . ,{on}) be some optimal
allocation. We show that SW(L) = SW(O). By definition, for every i there is an optimal allocation
Oi in which the item `i is allocated to player i and optimality implies that SW(Oi) = SW(O).
Summing over all i we get
n∑
i=1SW(O) =
n∑
i=1SW(Oi) (1)
The right side in (1) accounts for the welfare of n optimal allocations, each of which is by itself
a sum of n terms of the form vj(x) where every item and player appears exactly once (recall the
assumption that every optimal allocation allocates all items, i.e., is a perfect matching). Thus,
the right side in (1) is a sum of n2 terms in which every item and player appears exactly n times.
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Consider the bipartite graph G = (X,Y ;E) in which the left side X is the set of items, the right
side Y is the set of players and there is an edge {x, j} for each summand vj(x) appearing in the
right side of (1). Then G is an n-regular bipartite graph (possibly with multi-edges), and note that
the (perfect) matching induced by the legal allocation L appears in G (since the term vi(`i) appears
in SW(Oi), for every i). If we erase the edges of that matching from G then we are left with an(n − 1)-regular bipartite graph. It is a well-known fact that in this case the edges of G can be split
into n − 1 perfect matchings P1, . . . ,Pn−1. Thinking of these matchings as allocations, and together
with the allocation L, we get
n∑
i=1SW(O) =
n∑
i=1SW(Oi) = SW(L) +
n−1∑
i=1 SW(Pi).
Since SW(O) ≥ SW(L) and SW(O) ≥ SW(Pi) for every i (by optimality of O), it must be the case
that all weak inequalities are in fact equalities, establishing in particular that SW(O) = SW(L), as
desired.
We now describe the reduction from the general case to the unit-demand market case. We are
given a market with n agents where each agent is ki-demand and ∑i ki =m. Our reduction keeps
the same set of items M , but splits each agent i to ki identical unit-demand agents, where for each
copy, the value of the agent for an item x ∈M is simply vi(x). Clearly, the number of unit demand
agents as a result of this reduction is ∑i ki = m. Let Ni be the set of unit demand bidders that
corresponds to agent i, and let N ′ = ⋃i∈N Ni.
Given an allocation O = (Oi)i∈N for the original market, where ∣Oi∣ = ki for every i, the
corresponding allocation in the unit-demand market splits the ∣Oi∣ different items arbitrarily between
the unit demand bidders corresponding to bidder i, with each bidder receiving exactly one item.
Notice that the social welfare achieved by this allocation is the same as in the original allocation.
Similarly, given an allocation O′ = {O′`}`∈N ′ in the unit-demand market, the corresponding allocation
in the original market gives all the items allocated to agents in Ni to agent i. Again, since ∣Ni∣ = ki
the resulting allocation achieves the same welfare as the original one.
Lemma 3.8. An allocation is legal in the original market if and only if it is legal in the corresponding
unit-demand market. An allocation is optimal in the original market if and only if it is optimal in
the corresponding unit-demand market.
Proof. Consider an optimal allocation in the original market and recall our assumption that optimal
allocations give each player i exactly ki items. The corresponding allocation in the unit-demand
market obtains the same value. Similarly, given an optimal allocation in the unit-demand market
where each agent gets one item, the corresponding allocation in original market obtains the same
value. Therefore, an allocation is optimal in the original market if and only if it is optimal in the
corresponding unit-demand market.
Similar reasoning shows that given a legal allocation in the original market, the corresponding
allocation in the unit-demand market is legal as well and vice versa.
To complete the proof of Theorem 3.5, take a legal allocation in the original market. According
to Lemma 3.8 it is also legal in the corresponding unit-demand market. From Lemma 3.7, we get
that it is optimal in the unit-demand market. Again, by Lemma 3.8, we get that the corresponding
allocation in the original market is also optimal.
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3.1.4 The Item-Equivalence Graph
Let O be some optimal allocation and H the corresponding preference graph. For every player i
and set of players C ⊆ [n] ∖ {i}, we denote by Bi,C the set of items allocated to player i in O that
can alternatively be allocated to any player in C as a part of some optimal allocation (and only
to the players in C). For example, B1,{2,3} is the set of items x ∈ O1 such that there are optimal
allocations O′,O˜ in which x is allocated to players 2, 3 (respectively), and for any other player
j ∉ {1,2,3}, there is no optimal allocation in which x is allocated to j. Formally,
Bi,C ∶= {x ∈ Oi ∣ ∀j ∈ {i} ∪C x is legal for j∀j ∉ {i} ∪C x is not legal for j}
In other words, Bi,C is the set of items allocated to i in O and whose set of players to which they
are legal is exactly {i} ∪C. We make a few observations:
• The sets Bi,C form a partition of M (some of these sets might be empty sets).
• Let x ∈ Oi and y ∈ Oj for i ≠ j. If x → y participates in a 0-weight cycle in H and y ∈ Bj,C ,
then i ∈ C.
The second observation holds since if x → y participates in a 0-weight cycle, then there is an
alternative optimal allocation in which y is allocated to player i (see Claim 3.1 with w(C) = 0).
Definition 3.9 (Item-Equivalence Graph). Given an optimal allocation O, its associated item-
equivalence graph is the directed graph B = (T,D) with vertices
T = {Bi,C ∣ i ∈ [n] ,C ⊆ [n] ∖ {i},Bi,C ≠ ∅}
and directed edges
D = {Bi,C1 → Bj,C2 ∣ i ∈ C2} .
For example, (B1,∅ → B2,{1,4}) and (B2,{1,5} → B6,{2}) are edges in the item-equivalence graph
(assuming that the participating sets are non-empty), whereas, for example, (B1,∅ → B1,{2}) and(B2,{1} → B3,{1,4}) are not. Note also that the number of vertices is polynomial in m.
The next claim shows that the item-equivalence graph can be computed efficiently.
Claim 3.10. Given an optimal allocation O, its associated item-equivalence graph can be computed
in poly(m,n) time and value queries.
Proof. Clearly the main problem is determining the non-empty sets Bi,C . We can efficiently
determine the set Bi,C that any item x ∈ Oi belongs to by executing the following sub-routine:
go over all players j ∈ [n] ∖ {i} and compute the optimal social welfare in the residual market
obtained by fixing x to player j. Denote the result by optj and compare optj with the optimal
social welfare in the original market, denoted by opt. x belongs to the set Bi,C for the set of players
C = {j ∈ [n] ∖ {i} ∣ optj = opt}.
The following lemma uses Theorem 3.5 to establish a correspondence between 0-weight cycles in
H and cycles in B.
Lemma 3.11. Let O be an optimal allocation and let H and B be the corresponding preference
graph and item-equivalence graph, respectively. Then:
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1. If Bi1,C1 → ⋯→ Bik,Ck → Bi1,C1 is a cycle in B then for any items x1 ∈ Bi1,C1 , . . . , xk ∈ Bik,Ck ,
the cycle C = x1 → x2 → ⋯→ xk → x1 is a 0-weight cycle in H.
2. If C = x1 → x2 → ⋯→ xk → x1 is a 0-weight cycle in H, and x` ∈ Bi`,C` for every 1 ≤ ` ≤ k then
C ′ ∶= Bi1,C1 → ⋯→ Bik,Ck → Bi1,C1 is a cycle in B.
Proof. Let C = Bi1,C1 → ⋯Bik,Ck → Bi1,C1 be a cycle in B, let x1 ∈ Bi1,C1 , . . . , xk ∈ Bik,Ck and note
that the edges xi → xi+1 exist in H (since these are items that belong to different players). Consider
the cycle C ′ = x1 → ⋯→ ⋯xk → x1 in H. We need to show that w(C ′) = 0. We can assume w.l.o.g.
that all the items x` are different as otherwise C
′ is a union of two or more cycles for which this
assumption holds (these cycles are derived from corresponding sub-cycles of C), and the weight of
a union of 0-weight cycles is 0. By definition of B we have i` ∈ C`+1 for every 1 ≤ ` ≤ k (again we
identify k + 1 with 1) and so we conclude that the allocation A obtained from O by passing x`+1
to player i` is a legal allocation and thus optimal (by Theorem 3.5). Since O is also optimal, we
conclude by Claim 3.1 that
w(C) = SW(O) − SW(A) = 0.
We now prove part 2. Let C = x1 → ⋯→ xk → x1 be a 0-weight cycle in H. Again we can assume
w.l.o.g. that all items are different. For all ` let i` and C` be the player and set such that x` ∈ Bi`,C` .
By Claim 3.1 the allocation A obtained from O by passing x`+1 to player i` is optimal and thus
legal. We conclude that i` ∈ C`+1 for all 1 ≤ ` ≤ k implying that the edges Bi`,C` → Bi`+1,C`+1 exist in
B. Therefore C ′ = Bi1,C1 → ⋯Bik,Ck → Bi1,C1 is a cycle in B.
As explained in section 3.1.2, our main challenge in the dynamic pricing problem is to come up
with a method to remove all 0-weight cycles from H in a way that each potential deviation of any
player i from the designated bundle Oi, that emanates from the edge removals, is consistent with
some optimal allocation. In particular the method must overcome the “bottleneck problem” (as
illustrated in Figure 1). Lemma 3.11 allows us to shift the focus from removing 0-weight cycles in
H to removing cycles in B and translate these removals back to H.
[Running Example] Figure 2 shows the (simple) item-equivalence graph obtained from the initial
optimal allocation. Each of the items a, b is allocated to buyer 3 in some other optimal allocation
(and is never allocated to buyer 2). Thus a, b ∈ B1,{3}. Similarly we have c, d ∈ B2,{1} and e ∈ B3,{2}.
Note that removing any of the edges of the item-equivalence graph makes it cycle-free. Thus, by
Lemma 3.11, if we choose one of the edges e1, e2, e3 and remove all edges in the preference graph
corresponding to the chosen edge, then the preference graph will remain cycle-free as desired in the
Goal in section 3.1.2. Now, removing the edges corresponding to e1 could cause player 1 to take the
bundle {c, d} instead of his designated bundle {a, b}, and this cannot be completed to an optimal
allocation. On the other hand, removing the preference graph edges that correspond to the edges e2
and e3 is fine. If player 2 arrives first to the market, then the removal of edge e2 might cause her
to take the item e instead of c or d, and both options are consistent with some optimal allocation.
Likewise if player 3 arrives first and takes a or b instead of e then this too can be completed to an
optimal allocation. The important property here is that B3,{2} has minimal size in the cycle, and
thus removing its incoming and outgoing edges introduces tolerable potential deviations.
3.2 Solution for 3 Multi-Demand Buyers
We are now ready to present the dynamic pricing scheme for n = 3 multi-demand buyers.
16
B2,{1}B1,{3} B3,{2}
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e3
Figure 2: The item-equivalence graph for the running example. B3,{2} has minimal size among the
vertices.
Remark 3.12. The algorithm makes use of the item-equivalence graph. We abuse notation and
instead of writing Bi,{j} (Bi,{j,k}) we write Bij (Bijk). Thus the vertices of the item-equivalence
graph for three players are
B1,∅ B2,∅ B3,∅
B12 B21 B31
B123 B213 B312
B13 B23 B32
where each column corresponds to a different player.
ALGORITHM 1: Dynamic Pricing Scheme for 3 Multi-Demand Buyers.
Input: Multi-demand valuations (v1, v2, v3).
Output: prices p = (px)x∈M .
1 Compute some optimal allocation O.
2 Compute the preference graph H and the item-equivalence graph B based on O.
3 Mark all edges that participate in a cycle of size 2 in B.
4 In each of the cycles B13 → B21 → B32 → B13 and B12 → B31 → B23 → B12 (if these exist) choose a set of
minimal size and mark its incoming edge and outgoing edge in the cycle.
5 For every edge Bi1,C1 → Bi2,C2 in B that was marked, and for every x ∈ Bi1,C1 , y ∈ Bi2,C2 , remove the edge
x→ y from H. Denote the obtained graph by H ′.
6 Let ∆ > 0 be the difference in social welfare between the optimal and 2nd optimal allocation. Denote
 ∶= ∆
m+1 and for every edge e that was not removed (except for edges starting at the source vertex s)
update its weight to w′(e) = w(e) − .
7 Compute the min-weight paths from s to every x in H ′, and let δ(s, x) be its weight. For every item x set
the price px = −δ(s, x) + .
8 return (px)x∈M
[Running Example] Figure 3 demonstrates the graphs H,B and H ′ obtained in the pricing scheme
when run on our example, based on the optimal allocation O1 = {a, b},O2 = {c, d},O3 = {e}. The
edges that get marked in the item-equivalence graph are e2 and e3 in step 4. This translates to the
removal of the outgoing edges from c, d to e and from e to a, b when transitioning from H to H ′
and consequently no 0-weight cycles are left. This remains true also after subtracting  from every
edge that does not touch s.
As stated before (Section 3.1.1 and Claim 3.10), computing O, H and B can be done in
polynomial time. Finding the cycles in B can also be done efficiently (B has a constant number of
nodes) as well as computing min-weight paths. Thus the algorithm indeed runs in poly(m) time as
desired.
Lemma 3.13. After step 5 every cycle in H ′ has strictly positive weight.
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Figure 3: The various graphs obtained in the execution of Algorithm 1 on our running example.
The edges e2 and e3 in the item-equivalence graph were marked in step 4. Consequently, the edges
from c, d to e and from e to a, b were removed from the original preference graph.
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Proof. Since every cycle in H has non-negative weight (Corollary 3.2), it is enough to show that at
least one edge was removed from every 0-weight cycle (note that  is sufficiently small enough so
that any positive-weight cycle in H remains positive-weight in H ′). By Lemma 3.11 it is enough to
show that at least one edge was marked in each cycle in the item-equivalence graph. Let C be such
a cycle. Note that all outgoing edges of every vertex with 3 indices Bijk were marked in step 3 (for
every such edge, the reverse edge also exists in the item-equivalence graph, forming a 2-edge cycle).
Furthermore, the vertices Bi,∅ do not participate in any cycle as they have no incoming edges. Thus
we can assume that C contains only vertices with 2 indices. Assume w.l.o.g. that B12 is one of the
vertices in C. We split to the following cases, based on the structure of C starting at B12:
• Case 1: B12 → B21 → ⋯. Here, the first edge is part of a 2-edge cycle and thus it was marked.
• Case 2: B12 → B31 → B13 → ⋯. Here, the second edge was marked similarly to the previous
bullet.
• Case 3: B12 → B31 → B23 → ⋯. Here, at least one of the edges was marked in step 4.
Lemma 3.14. For any item x, px > 0.
Proof. The 0-weight path s → x is some path from s to x, and thus δ(s, x) ≤ 0. Thus px =−δ(s, x) +  > 0 as desired.
Lemma 3.15. For any player i, x ∈ Oi and y /∈ Oi ,if e = x→ y ∈H ′ then ui(x,p) > ui(y,p).
Proof. By the triangle inequality we have
δ(s, x) +w′(x→ y) ≥ δ(s, y) Ô⇒
δ(s, x) + vi(x) − vi(y) −  ≥ δ(s, y) Ô⇒
vi(x) − (−δ(s, x) + ) −  ≥ vi(y) − (−δ(s, y) + ) Ô⇒
vi(x) − px −  ≥ vi(y) − py Ô⇒
vi(x) − px > vi(y) − py
The claim follows.
Lemma 3.16. For any player i and item x ∈ Oi we have vi(x) − px > 0.
Proof. Consider a min-weight path from s to x in H ′, s→ x1 → ⋯→ xk = x, and for every 1 ≤ j ≤ k
let ij be the player such that xj ∈ Oij (note that ik = i). Since every cycle in H ′ has positive weight
(Lemma 3.13) it must be the case that all the vertices xi are different (otherwise this is not a
min-weight path) and k ≤m. We have
vik(xk) − pxk = vik(xk) + δ(s, x) − 
= vik(xk) + k−1∑
j=1(vij(xj) − vij(xj+1) − ) − 
= k∑
j=1 vij(xj) −
k−1∑
j=1 vij(xj+1) − (k − 1) − 
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≥ SW(O) − SW(A) − m
where A is the allocation obtained from O by passing the item xj+1 to player ij for all j, and
dis-allocating x1. Therefore, ∑kj=1 vij(xj) −∑k−1j=1 vij(xj+1) = SW(O) − SW(A). By the assumption
that every optimal allocation allocates all items, we conclude that A is a sub-optimal allocation
and therefore the last term is positive as desired (note that  is sufficiently small).
We are now ready to prove that the output of our dynamic pricing scheme meets the requirements
of Corollary 3.6. This is cast in the following lemma:
Lemma 3.17. Let p be the price vector output by the dyanmic pricing scheme. Then, For every
player i and S ∈Dp(i):
1. S is legal for player i.
2. S can be completed to a legal allocation, i.e. there exists an allocation of the items M ∖ S to
the other players in which every player receives a bundle that is legal for her.
Proof. We prove for i = 1 (the same proof applies also for i = 2,3). We first prove Part 1. We start
by showing that every S ∈Dp(1) is of size k1. Since all item prices are positive (Lemma 3.14) and
player 1 is k1-demand, it cannot be the case that player 1 maximizes utility with a bundle consisting
of more than k1 items. Furthermore, by Lemma 3.16 there are at least k1 legal items from which
she derives positive utility. Combining, every demanded bundle has exactly k1 items. Now, for any
two items x, y where x ∈ O1 and y is not legal for player 1, the edge x → y was not removed in
the transition from H to H ′ (since there is no corresponding edge in the item-equivalence graph
that could have been marked). Thus, player 1 strongly prefers x over y (by Lemma 3.15) and we
conclude that every demanded bundle contains only legal items, as desired.
We proceed to prove part 2. Let S ∈Dp(1). We refer to the items in S ∖O1 as the items that
player 1 ‘stole’ from players 2 and 3, and to the items in O1 ∖ S as those player 1 ‘left behind’. We
need to show that players 2 and 3 can compensate for their stolen items in a ‘legal manner’, that is,
by completing their leftover bundles O2 ∖ S and O3 ∖ S to k2 and k3 legal items, respectively. The
first step is to determine where the stolen and left behind items are taken from. This is done in the
following two claims:
Claim 3.18. (O1 ∖ S) ⊆ (B12 ∪B13 ∪B123).
Proof. Since O1 = B1,∅∪B12∪B13∪B123, it is enough to show that B1,∅ is contained in any demanded
bundle of Player 1. Note that B1,∅ does not participate in any cycle in the item-equivalence graph,
implying that none of its outgoing edges were marked. This in turn implies (by Lemma 3.15) that
player 1 strongly prefers every item of B1,∅ over every item y ∉ O1. Furthermore, she derives positive
utility from these items (Lemma 3.16). We conclude that the items in B1,∅ are contained in every
demanded bundle, as desired.
Claim 3.19. (S ∖O1) ⊆ (B21 ∪B213 ∪B31 ∪B312).
Proof. The claim follows directly from the fact that S is legal for player 1.
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We denote
a2 ∶= ∣(O1 ∖ S) ∩B12∣
a3 ∶= ∣(O1 ∖ S) ∩B13∣
a23 ∶= ∣(O1 ∖ S) ∩B123∣
b2 ∶= ∣(S ∖O1) ∩B21∣
b23 ∶= ∣(S ∖O1) ∩B213∣
b3 ∶= ∣(S ∖O1) ∩B31∣
b32 ∶= ∣(S ∖O1) ∩B312∣
In words, a2 is the number of items player 1 left behind in B12, b2 is the number of items she ‘stole’
from player 2 out of the items in B21, b32 is the amount she ‘stole’ from player 3 out of the items in
B312, etc. By the previous two claims and by the fact that ∣O1 ∖ S∣ = ∣S ∖O1∣ (since ∣O1∣ = ∣S∣) we
have
b2 + b23 + b3 + b32 = ∣S ∖O1∣ = ∣O1 ∖ S∣ = a2 + a23 + a3 (2)
Consider the bipartite graph G whose left side consists of the items in S ∖O1 and whose right
side consists of the items in O1 ∖ S, with edges (x, y) whenever the stolen item x can be replaced
by the leftover item y legally (e.g., if x ∈ O2, then y ∈ B12 ∪B123). Specifically, G is composed of a
bi-clique between the stolen items from B21 ∪B213 (the stolen items of player 2) and the leftover
items from B12 ∪ B123 (these are the leftover items that are legal for player 2), and of another
bi-clique between the stolen items of B31 ∪B312 (the stolen items of player 3) and the leftover items
of B13 ∪B123 (the leftover items that are legal for player 3). If there is a perfect matching in G, then
every stolen item can be replaced with the item it was matched to in the perfect matching, resulting
in a legal allocation, and we are done. Thus we assume that there is no perfect matching in G. In
this case Hall’s condition does not hold for G. One can verify that this implies one of the following:
b2 + b23 > a2 + a23 or b3 + b32 > a3 + a23
Assume w.l.o.g. that b2 + b23 > a2 + a23. Then, by equation (2), we have a3 > b3 + b32 ≥ 0. We claim
that this implies b23 = 0. The reason is that otherwise, player 1 stole some item, denoted y, from
B213 and left behind some item, denoted x, in B13. But this cannot be the case since this would
imply (by Lemma 3.15) that the edge x→ y was removed in the transition from H to H ′, but the
edge B13 → B213 was never marked in the pricing scheme. Therefore b23 = 0 and b2 > a2 + a23 ≥ 0.
The combination of b2 > 0 and a3 > 0 implies that the edge B13 → B21 was marked in step 4, and so
one of B13,B21 is of minimal size in the cycle B13 → B21 → B32 → B13. In particular,∣B32∣ ≥ min{∣B13∣ , ∣B21∣}≥ min{a3, b2}≥ min{a3 − (b3 + b32) , b2 − (a2 + a23)}= b2 − (a2 + a23) ,
where the equality holds by equation (2). In order to complete S to a legal allocation, player 2
compensates for his stolen b2 items by taking the a2 + a23 items player 1 left behind in B12 ∪B123
and by “stealing” b2 − (a2 + a23) items from B32 (indeed there are enough items there for player 2
to steal). Player 3 now has to compensate for the items stolen from her by both players, a total of
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(b32 + b3) + (b2 − (a2 + a23)) = a3 items. Since player 1 left precisely this number of items in B13,
player 3 can take them. Note that the resulting allocation is indeed legal and thus optimal.
4 Dynamic Pricing for Unit-Demand Bidders Without Tie-Breaking
In [10] the authors present a poly-time dynamic pricing scheme that leads to an optimal allocation
for unit-demand buyers. In their pricing scheme, buyers may have multiple bundles in their demand,
but every tie-breaking rule leads to optimal welfare. In this section, we show how the scheme from
[10] can be modified so that all buyers have exactly one bundle in their demand; i.e., pricing p
such that for every buyer i, ∣Dp(vi)∣ = 1, and the unique bundle in Dp(vi) is legal. This property
decreases the uncertainty regarding the obtained outcome.
As explained in section 3.2, we can assume w.l.o.g. that all items are necessary for optimality
(i.e., are allocated in every optimal allocation), thus m ≤ n. Moreover, we think of each optimal
allocation as if it allocates exactly n items, some of which are imaginary items (recall that for
unit-demand buyers, an imaginary item is legal for a player if there is some optimal allocation in
which that player receives no item; see Appendix B).
Our scheme also works by removing 0-weight cycles from the preference graph, but does so using
a different approach than [10]. Recall that in a 0-weight cycle, every item is legal for the player
possessing the preceding item in the cycle (this is an immediate corollary of Claim 3.1). In [10], the
whole cycle is removed, potentially allowing each buyer on the cycle to take the subsequent item.
Here, we take some item x on the cycle and replace its preceding item with a “copy” of item x.
This causes the item to be “owned” by more than one player, but this should not be concerning:
the preference graph properties guarantee that the item is demanded by all players owning it, in
addition to being legal for them. We show that we can repeatedly apply this item duplication
procedure until no 0-weight cycles remain in the preference graph. As before, all edge weights are
decreased by a sufficiently small , enabling us to set prices such that every demand correspondence
contains the corresponding buyer’s associated item, and that item only.
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The dynamic pricing scheme is presented below:
ALGORITHM 2: Dynamic Pricing Scheme for Unit-Demand Buyers Without Tie-Breaking.
Input: Unit-demand valuations (v1, . . . , vn).
Output: prices p = (px)x∈M .
1 Compute some optimal allocation O = (a1, . . . , an).
2 For every item ai, initiate a counter c (ai)← 1. This counter keep track of the number of players ai is
associated with.
3 Construct a graph H with a vertex di for every buyer i and directed weighted edges between every two
vertices, as follows:
4 For every player i initiate the associated item di ∶= ai.
5 For every i ≠ j, initiate the edge weight w(di → dj) ∶= vi (di) − vi (dj).
6 while there is a 0-weight cycle C in H in which all items are different do
7 Choose an edge di → dj in C such that dj ∈ arg maxdk∈C (c (dk)).
8 Update di ∶= dj .
9 c (di) ∶= c (di) − 1.
10 c (dj) ∶= c (dj) + 1.
11 Update edge weights as in Step 5.
12 end
13 Decrease the weight of every edge in H by a small enough ε > 0 so that the weight of every cycle remains
positive, except for the edges between vertices whose associated items are the same.
14 Add a dummy vertex s to H with a 0-weighted edge s→ di for every i.
15 For every item a set the price pa as follows:
16 if c (a) = 0 then
17 set pa =∞.
18 else
19 Let di be a vertex with which a is associated and set pa = −δ (s, di) + .
/* Note that the weight of any edge that connects two vertices that are associated
with the same item is 0. Thus there is no ambiguity in this step. */
20 end
21 return (px)x∈M
Lemma 4.1. The loop in step 6 terminates.
Proof. The sum of squares of the counters of all items strictly increases by at least 1 in every iteration.
Since this sum is upper bounded by n2 we conclude that there are at most n2 iterations.
Lemma 4.2. For every player i and item x that is associated with i at some stage of the pricing
scheme, x is legal for player i.
Proof. We prove by induction that the claim holds for all players in every iteration of the loop (step
6). Before the first iteration, every player i is associated with the item ai that is allocated to her in
the optimal allocation O, and ai is indeed legal for player i. Assume that the claim holds after the
k’th iteration. Let C = di1 → di2 → ⋯→ di` → di1 be the 0-weight cycle considered in the (k + 1)-th
iteration. By the induction hypothesis, for every 1 ≤ j ≤ ` the item dij is allocated to buyer ij in
some optimal allocation Oj . Consider the multi-edge bipartite graph G whose left side consists of
all buyers and whose right side consists of all items, and the edges are exactly all the edges of the
matchings {Oj}
1≤j≤`. Since every Oj is an optimal allocation, and we assume that all allocations
are perfect matchings, then G is an `-regular graph. The sum of all the weights of the edges in G is∑`j=1 SW (Oj) = ` ⋅OPT . Furthermore, G contains the (partial) matching m = {ij − dij}1≤j≤`. Since
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C is a 0-weight cycle, then, by Claim 3.1, SW (m) = SW (m′) where m′ is the matching obtained
from m by re-matching the item dij to player ij−1 for all j. We conclude that if we replace the
matching m with m′, and call the new bipartite graph G′, then G′ is still an `-regular graph with
SW (G) = SW (G′). Similar to the proof of Theorem 3.5, we conclude that G′ is a union of ` different
perfect matchings O′j , 1 ≤ j ≤ `, and since Oj is optimal for every j, then SW (Oj) ≥ SW (O′j) for
every j. From here we get SW (Oj) = SW (O′j) for every j. This concludes the proof since the
union of the (optimal) matchings O′j contains all the edges ij−1 − dij , implying that dij is legal for
player ij−1, and after the (k + 1)-th iteration exactly one of the edges of m is replaced by one of the
edges of m′.
Corollary 4.3. For every player i, the item associated with player i at the end of the pricing
scheme is legal for her.
Lemma 4.4. At the end of step 6 every cycle has strictly positive weight.
Proof. Using a very similar reasoning as in the proof of Lemma 4.2, it follows that in every iteration
of step 6, every cycle in which all items are different has non-negative weight. Combining this with
the loop condition, we conclude that at the end of Step 6 every cycle in which all items are different
has strictly positive weight.
Now consider a cycle C = di1 → di2 → ⋯→ di` → di1 in which some item appears more than once.
Assume w.l.o.g. that di1 and dik represent the same item for some 1 < k ≤ `. Clearly, the weight of
C is the sum of the weights of the two cycles C1 = di1 → ⋯dik−1 → di1 and C2 = dik → ⋯→ di` → dik .
Observe that both C1 and C2 contain less item repetitions than C. We apply this process recursively
on C1 and C2 until there are no repetitions, and conclude that the weight of C equals the sum of
the weights of the obtained cycles, each of which is one in which all items are different. The lemma
follows.
We conclude with the following Lemma.
Lemma 4.5. Let di be the final item associated with player i in the pricing scheme, and let p be
the output price vector. Then, Dp(vi) contains the unique bundle {di} if di is a real item, and ∅
otherwise.
Proof. It is convenient to think of the price of an imaginary item as always being 0. Under this
convention we prove:
1. px > 0 for any real item x.
2. If di is real then vi (di) − pdi > 0.
3. For any real item x ≠ di we have vi (di) − pdi > vi (x) − px.
We start by explaining how the lemma is derived from the above three conditions. If di is imaginary,
then condition 3 shows that player i derives negative utility from every real item, implying that
Dp(vi) = {∅} as required. If, on the other hand, di is real, then conditions 2,3 show that player i
strongly prefers di over every other (real) item and over getting nothing. Together with condition 1
and the fact that player i is unit-demand we obtain Dp(vi) contains only {di}, as required.
We now prove the three conditions:
24
• Condition 1: If px =∞, then the condition clearly holds. Otherwise, x appears in the (final)
preference graph and px > 0 as in the proof of Lemma 3.14.
• Condition 2: Let s→ di1 → ⋯→ dik = di be a min-weight path to di. If di and di1 represent
the same item, then in particular pdi = pdi1 =  and the condition holds whenever  > 0 is small
enough since vi(di) > 0 (di is legal for i and recall our assumption that all items are necessary
for optimality). Otherwise, the weight of the edge e = dik → di1 is w(e) = vi(di) − vi(di1) − .
The path together with the edge e closes a cycle which has positive weight (Lemma 4.4). The
weight of this cycle is
δ(s, di) +w(e) = δ(s, di) + vi(di) − vi(di1) −  = vi(di) − pdi − vi(di1) > 0.
The claim follows.
• Condition 3: Let x ≠ di be some real item. If px = ∞ then the condition clearly holds.
Otherwise there is some buyer j with dj = x, and by the triangle inequality we have
δ (s, di) +w (di → dj) ≥ δ (s, dj) .
Substituting w (di → dj) by vi(di) − vi(dj) −  gives us
vi(di) − (−δ (s, di) + ) > vi(dj) − (−δ (s, dj) + ) = vi(dj) − pdj .
If di is a real item, then this is exactly condition 3. Otherwise, di is imaginary and we get
vi(di) − pdi = 0 > vi(di) − (−δ (s, di) + ) > vi(dj) − pdj ,
as required (recall that −δ (s, di) ≥ 0).
5 Maximal Domain Theorems for Walrasian Equilibrium and Dy-
namic Pricing
In this section we prove Theorems 1.1 and 1.4, namely the maximal domain theorems for Walrasian
equilibrium and dynamic pricing, respectively. In section 5.1 we state and prove a variant of the
price based gross-substitutes characterization by Reijnierse et al. [35]. As a direct corollary we
obtain the following theorem, which will be needed to prove the maximal domain theorems (for a
discussion about the differences between this version and the original one, see Section 1.2).
Theorem 5.1. Let v be a non gross-substitutes valuation. Then there are bundles A,B ⊆M and a
price vector p such that :
1. ∣B ∖A∣ = 2.
2. ∣A ∖B∣ ≤ 1.
3. B ∈ arg minC ∶ u(C,p)>u(A,p)(∣C △A∣).
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As explained in the introduction, the original proof of Theorem 1.1 takes a non gross-substitutes
valuation v1 and uses the single-improvement property to claim the existence of some bundle A
and item prices p, relative to which A is not utility maximizing for v1, and any preferred bundle B
satisfies ∣B ∖A∣ ≥ 2 or ∣A ∖B∣ ≥ 2. The proof then considers such a bundle B minimizing ∣A△B∣,
and splits to cases according to whether ∣B ∖A∣ ≥ 2 or ∣A ∖B∣ ≥ 2.
Recall that Yang [40] discovered an error in the construction of the second case (∣A ∖B∣ ≥ 2).
Theorem 5.1 allows us to focus only on the first case. Since the original proof of that case is correct,
combining it with Theorem 5.1 provides a full and complete proof of Theorem 1.1.
In section 5.2 we prove Theorem 1.4. The market we construct is a perturbed version of the
original construction by Gul and Stacchetti, that satisfies the following two claims:
• If the market admits a dynamic pricing then it admits a Walrasian equilibrium.
• The market does not admit a Walrasian equilibrium.
The second claim constitutes a complete (and slightly altered compared to the original) proof of
Theorem 1.1, and the combination of the two claims yields Theorem 1.4.
5.1 A Characterization of Gross-Substitutes
In their paper, Reijnierse et al. prove the following:
Theorem 5.2 ([35]). A valuation v is gross-substitutes if and only if the following two conditions
hold:
• For every pair of different items x, y and bundle S ⊆M ∖ {x, y}, we have
v (S ∪ {x}) + v (S ∪ {y}) ≥ v (S) + v (S ∪ {x, y}) (SM)
• For every triplet of different items x, y, z and bundle S ⊆M ∖ {x, y, z}, we have
v (S ∪ {x}) + v (S ∪ {y, z}) ≤ max{v (S ∪ {y}) + v (S ∪ {x, z}) , v (S ∪ {z}) + v (S ∪ {x, y})}
(RGP)
The first condition is the well-known submodularity condition. The conditions (SM) and (RGP)
have analogous “price” counterparts:
Lemma 5.3 ([35]). A valuation v satisfies (SM) and (RGP) if and only if it satisfies the following
two conditions:
• There are no vector p ∈ R∣M ∣ (possibly with negative entries), two different items x, y and a
bundle S ⊆M ∖ {x, y} for which
Dp(v) = {S,S ∪ {x, y}} (P-SM)
• There are no vector p ∈ R∣M ∣ (possibly with negative entries), three different items x, y, z and
a bundle S ⊆M ∖ {x, y, z} for which
Dp(v) = {S ∪ {x}, S ∪ {y, z}} (P-RGP)
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The combination of Theorem 5.2 and Lemma 5.3 (essentially Lemma 4.2 in [31]) implies that if
v is not gross-substitutes, then either (P-SM) or (P-RGP) are violated. If, for example, (P-SM) is
violated, then there are a vector p, two different items x, y and a bundle S ⊆M ∖ {x, y} such that
Dp(v) = {S,S ∪ {x, y}}.
We can then decrease px and py by a small enough amount so that S ∪{x, y} becomes the unique
utility-maximizing bundle, and S becomes the only 2nd best bundle. It would appear that taking
the vector p together with A ∶= S and B = S ∪ {x, y} proves Theorem 5.1. However, the prices
obtained from Lemma 5.3 can be negative (and indeed are in the known construction) and therefore
are unsuitable. The same problem arises when assuming that (P-RGP) is violated.
The following is a different version of Lemma 5.3 with non-negative prices.
Lemma 5.4. A valuation v satisfies (SM) and (RGP) if and only if it satisfies the following two
conditions:
• There are no nonnegative price vector p, two different items x, y and a bundle S ⊆M ∖ {x, y}
for which px, py > 0 and{S,S ∪ {x, y}} ⊆Dp(v) ⊆ {T ∣ T ⊆ S} ∪ {T ∪ {x, y} ∣ T ⊆ S} (NP-SM)
• There are no nonnegative price vector p, three different items x, y, z and a bundle S ⊆
M ∖ {x, y, z} for which px, py, pz > 0 and{S ∪ {x}, S ∪ {y, z}} ⊆Dp(v) ⊆ {T ∪ {x} ∣ T ⊆ S} ∪ {T ∪ {y, z} ∣ T ⊆ S} (NP-RGP)
The combination of Theorem 5.2 and Lemma 5.4 imply:
Theorem 5.5. A valuation v is gross-substitutes iff it satisfies (NP-SM) and (NP-RGP).
The proof of Lemma 5.4, which to a large extent is adapted from [31] and [36], is deferred to
Appendix C. We now show how Theorem 5.5 implies Theorem 5.1.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Let v be valuation that is not gross substitutes. By Theorem 5.5, there is a
nonnegative price vector p and a bundle S such that one of the following holds:
1. There are items x, y ∉ S for which px, py > 0 and{S,S ∪ {x, y}} ⊆Dp(v) ⊆ {T ∣ T ⊆ S} ∪ {T ∪ {x, y} ∣ T ⊆ S}
2. There are items x, y, z ∉ S for which px, py, pz > 0 and{S ∪ {x}, S ∪ {y, z}} ⊆Dp(v) ⊆ {T ∪ {x} ∣ T ⊆ S} ∪ {T ∪ {y, z} ∣ T ⊆ S}
Assume 1, and decrease the price of x and y by a small enough  > 0 so that the new prices are still
nonnegative and S derives the 2nd highest utility under the new prices. Observe that all utility
maximizing bundles under the updated prices contain x, y, and S ∪ {x, y} is such a bundle. Thus,
if we choose A ∶= S and B ∶= S ∪ {x, y}, then A,B satisfy ∣B ∖A∣ = 2, ∣A ∖B∣ = 0, and every other
utility-maximizing bundle C satisfies ∣C △A∣ ≥ ∣B△A∣, as required. Likewise, if bullet 2 holds, then
we can take A ∶= S ∪ {x}, B = S ∪ {y, z} together with the price vector p after py and pz have been
decreased by a small enough amount.
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5.2 Proofs of the Maximal Domain Theorems
In this section we prove Theorems 1.1 and 1.4.
Proof of Theorems 1.1 and 1.4. Assume that v1 is not gross-substitutes. Thus Theorem 5.1 implies
the existence of bundles A,B and a price vector p for which ∣B ∖A∣ = 2, ∣A ∖B∣ ≤ 1, and B ∈
arg minC ∶ u1(C,p)>u1(A,p)(∣C △A∣). Denote B ∖ A = {b1, b2}, and if ∣A ∖B∣ = 1 then we denote
A ∖B = {a}. We now introduce our collection of unit demand buyers. The first, denoted v2, values
each b ∈ B ∖A at pb + v1(M) + 1 + ε′b and values every other item at 0. Moreover, if A ∖B is not
empty, then we have a buyer va that values a at pa + εa and values every other item at 0. Similarly,
we have a buyer vb for each item b ∈ B ∖A that values b at pb + εb and values every other item at
0. The values εa, εb, ε
′
b are defined later. Finally, we have a buyer vc for each c ∈M ∖ (A ∪B) that
values c at v1(M) + 1 and values every other item at 0. Our goal is to set the numbers εa, εb, ε′b
such that the following two requirements are satisfied: if the market admits a dynamic pricing
then it admits a Walrasian equilibrium, and the market does not admit a Walrasian equilibrium.
The combination of the two requirements clearly implies both theorems. To this end, consider the
collection A of all allocations that satisfy the following properties:
• a is allocated to one of {v1, va}.
• Each item b ∈ B ∖A is allocated to one of {v1, v2, vb}.
• Each item c ∉ A ∪B is allocated to vc.
• Buyer v2 takes exactly one item out of B ∖A.
• The items in A ∩B are all allocated to v1.
We would like to set the numbers εa, εb, ε
′
b such that no two allocations in A have the same social
welfare. When do two allocations O1,O2 ∈ A have the same social welfare? Consider the following
table that specifies the difference between O1 and O2:
O1 O2
1 C D
2 e f
a G H
b ∈ B ∖A I J
C and D are the bundles allocated to buyer 1 in O1 and O2, respectively. e and f are the items
allocated to buyer 2 in O1 and O2, respectively. G ⊆ {a} equals {a} if a is allocated to buyer va in
O1 and otherwise G = ∅. I ⊆ B ∖A is the set of items b ∈ B ∖A that are allocated to buyer vb in
O1. H,J are defined similarly. Allocations O1 and O2 have the same social welfare exactly when
v1(C) + (pe + v1(M) + 1 + ε′e) + ∑
a∈G(pa + εa) +∑b∈I(pb + εb) + ∑c∈M∖(A∪B)(v1(M) + 1) =
v1(D) + (pf + v1(M) + 1 + ε′f) + ∑
a∈H(pa + εa) +∑b∈J(pb + εb) + ∑c∈M∖(A∪B)(v1(M) + 1)
which in turn, by rearranging, occurs exactly when
ε′e − ε′f + ∑
a∈G∖H εa − ∑a∈H∖G εa + ∑b∈I∖J εb − ∑J∖I εb =
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v1(D) − v1(C) + ∑
a∈H∖Gpa − ∑a∈G∖H pa + ∑b∈J∖I pb − ∑b∈I∖J pb + pf − pe (3)
To achieve unique welfare for each allocation O ∈ A we must set εa, εb, ε′b so that equation (3) never
holds whenever O1 ≠ O2. The bottom expression in (3) is a function of C,D, e, f,G,H, I, J and
all of εa, εb, ε
′
b are in the top expression. If we set these values so that the top expression never
evaluates to 0, but also small enough so that its absolute value is always smaller than the smallest
possible non-zero absolute value of the bottom expression, then equality never holds, as desired.
To this end denote the bottom expression of equation (3) by dC,D,e,f,G,H,I,J , and define δ to be the
minimal positive absolute value of dC,D,e,f,G,H,I,J among all possible choices of C,D, e, f,G,H, I, J .
If ∣dC,D,e,f,G,H,I,J ∣ = 0 for all possible choices, then we set δ = 1. We also define
ε ∶= min{δ
2
,
u1(B,p) − u1(A,p)
4
} .
We now finally define the numbers εa, εb, ε
′
b and complete the construction. We set:
εb1 ∶= ε/21
εb2 ∶= ε/22
εa ∶= ε/23
ε′b1 ∶= ε/24
ε′b2 ∶= ε/25
We claim that whenever O1 and O2 are different allocations, the top expression of equation (3)
has positive absolute value that is smaller than δ. To see this, note that each of εa, εb1 , εb2 , ε
′
b1
, ε′b2
appears at most once in the top expression of equation (3), and at least one appears whenever
O1 and O2 are not the same allocation. Take the number with the smallest power of 2 in the
denominator and assume w.l.o.g. that it is preceeded with a minus sign. Then, even if the rest of
the numbers appear with a plus sign, the entire expression still evaluates to a negative value strictly
between -δ and 0. By definition of δ the equation cannot hold in this case and we obtain the desired
uniqueness. We have proved:
Claim 5.6. For every two different allocations O1,O2 ∈ A, we have SW(O1) ≠ SW(O2).
Corollary 5.7. Each item x ∈ M ∖ (A ∩ B) is allocated to the same player in every optimal
allocation.
Proof. Let O be an optimal allocation. The following hold with respect to O:
• a is allocated to one of {v1, va} (otherwise the welfare can be increased by reallocating a to
va).
• Each item b ∈ B ∖A is allocated to one of {v1, v2, vb} (otherwise the welfare can be increased
by reallocating b to vb).
• Each item c ∈M ∖ (A ∪B) is allocated to vc (similarly).
• v2 takes exactly one item out of M ∖ (A ∩B), and this item is in B ∖A (similarly).
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Therefore, if we begin with the allocation O and reallocate all the items in A ∩B to v1 then the
resulting allocation is in A. Furthermore, since the unit demand players value each item in A∩B at
0 and v1 is monotone, we conclude that this modification does not incur a loss in welfare, implying
that optimality is preserved. The claim follows since there is at most one optimal allocation in A
(by Claim 5.6) and the modification does not reallocate any item in M ∖ (A ∩B).
Corollary 5.7 can be rephrased as follows:
Corollary 5.8. There is some partition of M ∖ (A ∩B), denoted {S1, S2} ∪ {Sx}x∈M∖(A∩B) such
that in every optimal allocation the bundle received by player vi contains Si and perhaps also some
subset of A ∩B.
We are now ready to prove:
Lemma 5.9. If the market admits a dynamic pricing, then it admits a Walrasian equilibrium.
Proof. Let q be a dynamic pricing for the market. Recall that for any player vi and any S ∈Dq(vi)
there is some optimal allocation in which vi receives the bundle S. Thus, by Corollary 5.8, Si ⊆ S
for any S ∈Dq(vi). Furthermore, for any player vi ≠ v1 the items in A ∩B do not add anything to
the utility, implying that Si ∈Dq(vi). Moreover, even if we update q so that all items in A ∩B are
priced at 0, and denote the new price vector by q′, then we would still have Si ∈Dq′(vi). Note also
that this update can only make player v1 want A∩B more than before. Thus S1∪(A∩B) ∈Dq′(v1).
We have thus shown that the allocation (S1 ∪ (A ∩B), S2, (Sx)x∈M∖(A∩B)) together with the prices
q′ constitute a Walrasian equilibrium, as desired.
It is left to prove that the market does not admit a Walrasian equilibrium.
Lemma 5.10. The market composed of the buyers {v1, v2} ∪ {vx}x∈M∖(A∩B) does not admit a
Walrasian equilibrium.
We remark that Lemma 5.10 proves Theorem 1.1 and that the proof is mainly adapted from the
original proof of Theorem 1.1.
Proof. Assume towards contradiction that the allocation Y = (Y1, (Yx)x∈M∖(A∩B)) together with the
price vector t is a Walrasian equilibrium. Let X = (X1, (Xx)x∈M∖(A∩B)) be the allocation obtained
from Y by reallocating all of A ∩B to v1. Define the price vector q as follows:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
qa = pa + εa
qx = 0 x ∈ A ∩B
qx = tx x ∈M ∖A
The same arguments as in the original proof of Theorem 1.1 show that:
• X,q is a Walrasian equilibrium,
• A ∩B ⊆X1 ⊆ A ∪B
• X2 = {bi} for one of i = 1,2, implying that B ∖X1 ≠ ∅. Assume w.l.o.g. that X2 = {b2}.
The last two bullets the following:
• A ∖X1 equals one of {a},∅
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• X1 ∖A equals one of {b1},∅
and in any case, since ∣B ∖A∣ = 2, we have ∣A△X1∣ < ∣A△B∣. By the minimality of B we
have u1(X1,p) ≤ u1(A,p) < u1(B,p). Assume that X1 ∖ A = {b1}. Consider the difference
u1(A,p) − u1(X1,p) ≥ 0. By how much does the difference change when modifying the prices from
p to q? The items in A ∩X1 do not contribute to the change (the prices of these items cancel out
when evaluating the difference). A ∖X1 contributes no less than −εa. Moreover, b1 ∉Xb1 , implying
qb1 ≥ pb1 + εb1 (otherwise vb1 would prefer having b1). We conclude that X1 ∖A contributes at least
εb1 to the difference change. But by definition, each b ∈ B ∖A satisfies εb − εa > 0 and in particular
the difference is strictly larger at the prices q compared to p. Thus we have
u1(X1,q) < u1(A,q)
which is a contradiction since (X,q) is a Walrasian equilibrium (implying in particular that
X1 is a favorite bundle for v1 with respect to q). Now assume that X1 ∖ A = ∅. Denote d ∶=
u1(B,p) − u1(A,p) > 0. When passing from p to q, the total price of of A ∖X1 increased by at
most εa ≤  ≤ d/4 (recall the definition of ). Together with u1(X1,p) ≤ u1(A,p) we have
u1(X1,q) ≤ u1(A,q) + d/4. (4)
Now, since X1 ⊆ A and X2 = {b2}, we must have b1 ∈Xb1 , implying
qb1 ≤ pb1 + εb1 < pb1 + d4
where the second inequality holds by definition of b1 , and the first holds since otherwise vb1 would
rather not have b1. Moreover, since buyer v2 (weakly) prefers b2 over b1, then we have
pb1 + v1(M) + 1 + ε′b1 − qb1 ≤ pb2 + v1(M) + 1 + ε′b2 − qb2 ⇔
qb2 ≤ pb2 + qb1 − pb1 + ε′b2 − ε′b1
and since qb1 ≤ pb1 + εb1 , we also have
qb2 ≤ pb2 + εb1 + ε′b2 − ε′b1≤ pb + d
4
We have shown that qb ≤ pb + d4 for every b ∈ B ∖A, and conclude that when passing from p to q,
the total price of B ∖A increased by at most d/2. Since the total price change of A ∖B did not
decrease then we have
u1(B,q) − u1(A,q) ≥ u1(B,p) − u1(A,p) − d/2 (5)
Combining (4) and (5) we get
u1(B,q) − u1(X1,q) ≥ u1(A,q) + u1(B,p) − u1(A,p) − d/2 − u1(A,q) − d/4= d − 3
4
d > 0
and again this is a contradiction since (X,q) is a Walrasian equilibrium.
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6 A Budget-Additive Market with Dynamic Pricing and without
Walrasian Equilibrium
Consider the example given by Feldman and Lucier [20], with 4 players ci, di for i ∈ {1,2}, and 7
items ai, bi, αi for i ∈ {1,2} and β. Each of the buyers is budget-additive with budget 2, meaning
that the value for a bundle S is v(S) = min{2,∑x∈S v({x})}. For i ∈ {1, 2}, ci has value 1 for ai, bi, αi
and value 0 for the rest of the items, and di has value 2 for β, value 1 for ai, bi and value 0 for
the rest. It can be easily verified that OPT = 7 in this market. Furthermore, [20] showed that the
market does not admit a Walrasian equilibrium. However, we claim that it does admit an optimal
dynamic pricing. To see this, consider the first round prices
p1α1 = p1α2 = p1β = 
p1a1 = p1a2 = 2
p1b1 = p1b2 = 3
We split to cases according to the first incoming buyer, and we can assume w.l.o.g. that it is either
c1 or d1 (the other cases are symmetric):
1. Buyer c1 arrives first. Under the above prices he takes α1 and a1. At this point, we set the
following prices for all subsequent rounds:
p2β = p2b1 = 
p2a2 = p2α2 = 2
p2b2 = 3
The earlier of d1, d2 to arrive takes β. If d1 arrives later he takes b1 and c2 takes a2 and α2 .
If d2 arrives later and before c2 he takes a2, b2 and c2 takes α2. If d2 arrives last, c2 takes a2
and α2 and d2 takes b2. OPT is achieved in any alternative.
2. Buyer d1 arrives first. In this case, the initial prices are used throughout. Buyer d1 takes β. c1
takes a1, α1 regardless of his place in line. If d2 arrives before c2, he takes a2, b2 and c2 takes
α2. Otherwise, c2 takes a2, α2 and d2 takes b2. Again, OPT is achieved.
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A Preference Graph Properties
A.1 Proof of Claim 3.1
Proof. The weight of the cycle is
w(C) = k∑
i=1w(xi → xi+1)
= k∑
i=1 vi(xi) − vi(xi+1)
35
Let y be an arbitrary item. If y ∉ {x1, . . . xk} then it is allocated to the same player in O and in
A, ergo contributing 0 to the difference SW(O) − SW(A). If, on the other hand, y = xi, then it
contributes vi(xi) − vi−1(xi) to the difference (since it is allocated to player i in O and to player
i − 1 in A). We have established that
SW(O) − SW(A) = k∑
i=1 vi(xi) − vi−1(xi)
= k∑
i=1 vi(xi) − vi(xi+1)= w(C)
A.2 Proof of Corollary 3.2
Proof. If all vertices in the cycle are different then this is immediate by Claim 3.1 and the fact that
O is optimal. If some vertices are repeated then the cycle is a union of two or more cycles with no
vertex repetition (whose weights are non-negative). The claim holds since the weight of the cycle
equals the sum of the weights of the repetition-free sub-cycles.
A.3 Proof of Claim 3.3
Proof. Part 1 holds since the edge s→ x is a particular path from s to x and its weight is 0 (and
the weight of a min-weight path from s to x can only be smaller). Part 2 holds by the triangle
inequality:
δ(s, x) +w(x→ y) ≥ δ(s, y) Ô⇒
δ(s, x) + vi(x) − vi(y) ≥ δ(s, y) Ô⇒
vi(x) − px ≥ vi(y) − py
To show part 3, consider a min-weight path s → x1 → ⋯ → xk = x from s to x. Let’s assume first
that x1 ∉ Oi. Then the edge x→ x1 exists and the weight of the cycle obtained by combining the
edge with the path is:
δ(s, x) +w(x→ x1) = −px + vi(x) − vi(x1) ≥ 0
where the inequality holds by Corollary 3.2, and the result follows (recall that valuations are
normalized and monotone implying vi(x1) ≥ 0). We now assume that x1 ∈ Oi. If k = 1 (i.e., the path
is simply the edge s→ x) then px = 0 and the result follows. Otherwise, x2 ∉ Oi and the edge x→ x2
does exist. The weight of the cycle x2 → ⋯→ x→ x2 is
0 ≤ δ(x2, x) +w(x→ x2)= δ(x2, x) + vi(x) − vi(x2)= (vi(x1) − vi(x2)) + δ(x2, x) + (vi(x) − vi(x1))= δ(s, x) + vi(x) − vi(x1)= −px + vi(x) − vi(x1)
and again the result follows.
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B Dynamic Pricing for 3 Multi-Demand Buyers: the Case where
Demand Exceeds Supply
In this section, we generalize the result of Section 3.2 for the case where m ≤ ∑i ki. A natural
approach would be to introduce imaginary items with value 0 to all players, and apply the same
techniques as in Section 3.2 to the obtained market. This approach ultimately succeeds, but
introduces non-trivial challenges along the way which should be handled carefully. In particular,
establishing the equivalent of Lemma 3.16 for the generalized setting (Lemma B.5) requires new
ideas and more subtle arguments.
We fix a buyer profile v = (v1, . . . , vn) over the item set M , where each vi is ki-demand. As
explained in section 3 we can assume w.l.o.g. that all items are essential for optimality (i.e. each
item is allocated in every optimal allocation), implying that every optimal allocation hands at
most ki items to player i, for every i. in section 3 we made the simplifying assumption that each
optimal allocation hands exactly ki items to player i for every i. This was necessary for the proof
of Theorem 3.5, which was crucial for establishing the correctness of the dynamic pricing scheme.
In general though, the number of items might be smaller than ∑i ki, in which case not all players
exhaust their demand in every optimal allocation. In order to simulate this condition and present
a dynamic pricing scheme that follows the same ideas of the scheme in the simplified setting, we
introduce to the market ∑ni=1 ki −m “imaginary items”, valued at 0 by all players, and for every
original optimal allocation in which a player i receives less than ki items, we think of it as if the
amount of received items is exactly ki, where some of the items can be imaginary. Furthermore, it
is convenient to think of the price of an imaginary item as always being 0. We formalize these ideas
in the following:
Definition B.1.
1. The augmented market of a buyer profile v = (v1, . . . , vn) is the buyer profile v′ = (v′1, . . . , v′n)
defined on the item set M ′ =M ∪ {d1, . . . , d∑ni=1 ki−m}, where for every i, v′i is ki-demand with
v′i(x) = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩vi(x) x ∈M0 x ∈ {d1, . . . , d∑ni=1 ki−m}
The items d1, . . . , d∑ni=1 ki−m are called imaginary items.
2. An augmented optimal allocation is any original optimal allocation augmented with the
additional imaginary items such that every player i receives exactly ki items. Formally, an
allocation O′ is an augmented optimal allocation if every player i is allocated exactly ki items,
and there is an optimal allocation O such that for every original item x ∈M we have that
x ∈ Oi iff x ∈ O′i.
3. For any price vector p on M , its augmented price vector p′ is the price vector on M ′ where
p′x = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩px x ∈M0 otherwise
Remark B.2.
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• Since v′i and vi coincide on the set of real items M , we abuse notation and use vi when referring
to v′i (and similarly for ui and u′i).
• Every augmented optimal allocation in the augmented market is essentially an optimal
allocation in the original market, padded with the appropriate number of imaginary items, to
match demand.
• Since imaginary items always have value and price of 0, it follows that for any player i, bundle
S ⊆M such that ∣S∣ ≤ ki and price vector p on M we have S ∈Dp(i) ⇐⇒ S∪{d1, . . . , dki−∣S∣} ∈
Dp′(i).
In our dynamic pricing scheme we adjust the tools used in the simplified setting to accommodate
settings where demand exceeds supply. In particular, we still use the preference graph, except that
its vertex set corresponds to all items, including imaginary ones, and its edges are defined with
respect to some augmented optimal allocation O. Analogous reasoning gives us the following claim.
Recall that δ(s, x) is the min-weight path from s to x in the preference graph H.
Claim B.3. Consider the (non-negative) prices px = −δ(s, x) for every real item x, and the
augmented prices p′. Let i, x, y be such that x ∈ Oi, y ∉ Oi, and both x, y can be either real or
imaginary. Then player i weakly prefers x over y, i.e.
vi(x) − p′x ≥ vi(y) − p′y
An item x ∈M ′ (real or imaginary) is called legal for player i if there is some augmented optimal
allocation O′ = (O′1, . . . ,O′n) such that x ∈ O′i. Note that an imaginary item is legal for some player
i if there is an optimal allocation in the original market in which player i receives strictly less than
ki items. Legal bundles and allocations are defined as in the main exposition. Theorem 3.5 then
directly translates to our setting as follows. An allocation in the augmented market is legal iff it is
augmented optimal, implying the following lemma.
Lemma B.4. A price vector p is a dynamic pricing for the original market if for every player i
and S ∈Dp(i):
1. The augmented set S′ = S ∪ {d1, . . . dmin{ki−∣S∣,∑ki−m}} is legal for player i in the augmented
market.
2. There exists an allocation of the items M ′ ∖ S′ to the other players in which every player
receives a bundle that is legal for her.
The item-equivalence graph is also defined analogously. An imaginary item x is in the set
Bi,C iff there is an optimal allocation in the original market in which player i receives strictly less
than ki items. Furthermore, for any two imaginary items x ∈ Bi,C1 , y ∈ Bj,C2 for i ≠ j we have{i}∪C1 = {j}∪C2 (all imaginary items are legal for the same set of players since they are valued the
same by all players). Lemma 3.11 carries over to our setting as well. Equipped with the modified
tools, the dynamic pricing scheme is defined analogously to the main exposition, only that prices are
set only for the real items (but based on the preference graph that includes the imaginary items).
The only part of the analysis that does not carry over directly from the main exposition is the proof
of Lemma 3.16 (ensuring a strictly positive utility from every item x ∈ Oi). This lemma was crucial
to argue that each demanded set of player i contains exactly ki items. In our setting it is required
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in order to argue that each such demanded set contains at least ∣Oi ∩M ∣ items (i.e. the amount of
real items in Oi), implying in particular that for each S ∈Dp(i),∣S′∣ = ∣S ∪ {d1, . . . dmin{ki−∣S∣,∑ki−m}}∣ = ki,
which is needed for the proof of Part 1 of Lemma B.4 (the analog of Lemma 3.17, whose proof also
directly carries over to our setting).
We next explain why the proof of Lemma 3.16 does not carry over to augmented markets. In
the proof, we argued that the utility vi(x)− px equals SW(O)−SW(A), where A is some allocation
in which some item is not allocated. Thus, A is necessarily sub-optimal, and the utility is strictly
positive, as required. This reasoning fails in our setting since the un-allocated item might be
imaginary, in which case A may still be optimal. In what follows we show that the lemma still
holds.
Lemma B.5. For any player i and real item x ∈ Oi ∩M , vi(x) − px > 0.
Proof. Consider a min-weight path from s to x in H ′ , s→ x1 → ⋯→ xk = x (recall that H ′ is the
modified preference graph), and suppose that xj ∈ Oij for all j (with ik = i). Since every cycle in H ′
has positive weight (Lemma 3.13) it must be the case that all the vertices xi are different (otherwise
this is not a min-weight path). We split to cases:
1. The item x1 is real. In this case, the proof is identical to that of Lemma 3.16.
2. The edge x→ x1 exists (i.e., x and x1 do not belong to the same buyer and the edge was not
removed in the transition from H to H ′). In this case the cycle C obtained by connecting x
to x1 exists in H
′ and its weight is positive (Lemma 3.13). Thus we have
0 < w(C)= δ(s, x) +w(x→ x1)= δ(s, x) + vi(x) − vi(x1) − ≤ vi(x) − (−δ(s, x) + )= vi(x) − px
as desired.
3. One of the edges xd → xd+1 of the path does not correspond to an edge in the item-equivalence
graph. I.e., if xd ∈ Bid,Cd , xd+1 ∈ Bid+1,Cd+1 , then id ∉ Cd+1. In this case there is no augmented
optimal allocation in which xd+1 is allocated to player id and thus the allocation A obtained
from O by passing the item xj+1 to player ij for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1 and dis-allocating x1 is not
optimal. Here again, the proof follows from the same reasoning as the proof of Lemma 3.16.
In the remaining cases we assume that the edge x→ x1 does not exist, x1 is imaginary and that
all path edges correspond to item-equivalence graph edges that were not marked in the transition
from H to H ′. In particular, all inner vertices of the path must belong to 2-index vertices of the
item-equivalence graph (i.e. vertices of the form Bij), since all outgoing edges from 3-index vertices
in the item-equivalence graph were marked in step 3, and 1-index sets have no incoming edges.
4. x1 belongs to a 3-indexed set of the item-equivalence graph. Thus it cannot be an inner vertex
and we have x1 = xk = x. However this is a contradiction since x is a real item and x1 is
imaginary.
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Remark: All cases up to now did not make any assumption on the structure of O. In the
remaining cases we use the following terminology: given a cycle in the item-equivalence graph in
which all vertices are different, “applying the cycle” means choosing an arbitrary item from each
vertex in the cycle, followed by returning the augmented optimal allocation obtained by reallocating
each of the items to the player possessing the preceding item in the cycle.
5. x1 belongs to a 1-indexed set. W.l.o.g. x1 ∈ B1,∅. If xk ∉ O1, then the edge xk → x1 exists in
H ′ and this is handled in case 1. Thus we assume that xk belongs to player 1. x2 ∉ B213 ∪B312
as otherwise x2 is an inner vertex that belongs to a 3-indexed set, contradicting our assumption.
Thus x2 ∈ B21 or x2 ∈ B31. Assume x2 ∈ B21. x3 ∉ B123 ∪ B12 (corresponding edges were
marked in Step 3) and also x3 ∉ B312 (cannot be inner vertex and cannot be final vertex since
it does not belong to player 1). The remaining possibility is that x3 ∈ B32. In this case we
cannot have x4 ∈ B13 (one of the edges B21 → B32,B32 → B13 was marked in Step 4). Similarly
we cannot have x4 ∈ B23 ∪B213 (corresponding edges were marked in Step 3). We conclude
that x4 = x = xk ∈ B123, and the (item-equivalence graph) path is
B1,∅ → B21 → B32 → B123
In the analogous case where x2 ∈ B31, the resulting path is
B1,∅ → B31 → B23 → B123
We now show that there is an alternative augmented optimal allocation in which both paths
do not exist in the item-equivalence graph (i.e., one of the sets in each path is empty). We
can then update the algorithm by adding a pre-processing step in which the base augmented
optimal allocation is updated to the new one if it so happens that the imaginary items
belong to B1,∅. In the new allocation the current case is vacuous. To this end, note that
the cycles C1 = B21 → B32 → B123 → B21 and C2 = B31 → B23 → B123 → B31 are cycles in the
item-equivalence graph. Consider the following procedure:
While one of the cycles C1,C2 exists in the item-equivalence graph (i.e. the corresponding
vertices are non-empty sets), “apply” one of them.
Note that each application of C1 decreases ∣B21∣ , ∣B32∣ , ∣B123∣ by 1 (and increases ∣B23∣ , ∣B312∣ , ∣B12∣
by 1). Each application of C2 decreases ∣B31∣ , ∣B23∣ , ∣B123∣ by 1 (and increases ∣B32∣ , ∣B213∣ , ∣B13∣
by 1). In particular, the sum ∣B21∣ + ∣B123∣ + ∣B31∣
strictly decreases after each iteration. We conclude that the procedure must end and none of
these paths exists in the obtained augmented optimal allocation.
6. x1 is imaginary and belongs to a 2-indexed set of the item-equivalence graph. W.l.o.g. x1 ∈ B32.
It cannot be the case that x2 ∈ B23 ∪ B213 (the corresponding edges were marked in Step
3). If x2 ∈ B123, then x2 = x but the edge x2 → x1 was not removed in the transition to H ′,
and this case was covered in part 2. The remaining possibility is that x2 ∈ B13. Note that
the edge x2 → x1 exists in H ′ and thus x2 ≠ x. It cannot be the case that x3 ∈ B21 (one of
the edges B32 → B13,B13 → B21 was marked in Step 4). x3 ∉ B312 ∪B31 (the corresponding
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edges were marked in Step 3). The last possibility is that x3 = x ∈ B213 and the corresponding
item-equivalence graph path is
B32 → B13 → B213
(indeed, the edge x3 → x1 does not exist in H ′ since the edge B213 → B32 was marked in Step
3). Furthermore, every imaginary item can belong either to B32 or B23. In the analogous case
where x1 ∈ B23, the resulting item-equivalence graph path is
B23 → B12 → B312
As in the previous case we will show that there is a “cycle application” procedure that results
in an alternative augmented optimal allocation in which none of these paths exists. Denote
the cycles
C1 = B32 → B13 → B213 → B32
C2 = B23 → B12 → B312 → B23
and our assumption is that C1 exists in the bottlneck graph. The procedure goes as follows:
• While ∣B13∣ , ∣B213∣ , ∣B12∣ , ∣B312∣ ≥ 1 (all inequalities hold)
– Apply C1, then apply C2
• If ∣B12∣ = 0 or ∣B312∣ = 0, apply C1 min{∣B13∣ , ∣B213∣ , ∣B32∣} times and terminate.
• Otherwise (i.e., ∣B13∣ = 0 or ∣B213∣ = 0), apply C2 min{∣B12∣ , ∣B312∣ , ∣B23∣} times and
terminate.
Each application of C1 decreases ∣B13∣ , ∣B213∣ , ∣B32∣ by 1, and increases ∣B123∣ , ∣B23∣ , ∣B31∣ by
1. Each application of C2 decreases ∣B12∣ , ∣B312∣ , ∣B23∣ by 1 and increases ∣B123∣ , ∣B32∣ , ∣B21∣
by 1. Therefore, in total, each iteration of the loop decreases each of ∣B13∣ , ∣B213∣ , ∣B12∣ , ∣B312∣
by 1 and the loop in the process ends, with either C1 or C2 non-existent. The final step takes
care of eliminating the other cycle (note that applying the leftover cycle does not resurrect its
counterpart cycle).
C Proof of Lemma 5.4
Proof. We first show that (SM) is equivalent to (NP-SM), and then we show that under the
assumption that (SM) holds, (RGP) is equivalent to (NP-RGP). The combination implies the
lemma.
Assume that (NP-SM) does not hold, i.e., there are corresponding non-negative price vector p,
items x, y and a bundle S. Then,
S,S ∪ {x, y} ∈Dp(v)
S ∪ {x}, S ∪ {y} ∉Dp(v)
implying
v(S) + v(S ∪ {x, y}) − 2 ⋅∑
d∈S pd − px − py > v(S ∪ {x}) + v(S ∪ {y}) − 2 ⋅∑d∈S pd − px − py.
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We conclude that (SM) is violated. For the converse direction, assume (SM) is violated; i.e.,
v(S) + v(S ∪ {x, y}) = v(S ∪ {x}) + v(S ∪ {y}) + δ
for some δ > 0. We define the prices p as follows. Set pd =∞ for any d ∉ S ∪ {x, y} to guarantee
that no item outside of S ∪ {x, y} is demanded. Set pd = 0 for any d ∈ S. Finally, let  ∶= δ/2 and set
px ∶= v(x∣S ∪ {y}) − 
py ∶= v(y∣S ∪ {x}) − 
First we show that px, py are positive:
px ∶= v(S ∪ {x, y}) − v(S ∪ {y}) − 1
2
(v(S) + v(S ∪ {x, y}) − v(S ∪ {x}) − v(S ∪ {y}))
= 1
2
(v(S ∪ {x, y}) − v(S ∪ {y}) + v(S ∪ {x}) − v(S))
≥ 1
2
(v(S ∪ {x, y}) − v(S ∪ {y}))
≥ 1
2
δ> 0,
where the first and second inequalities hold since v(S ∪ {x}) − v(S) ≥ 0 (v is monotone). py > 0 can
be shown similarly. The definitions of px and py directly imply
u(S ∪ {x, y}) > u(S ∪ {x}), u(S ∪ {y})
and it is also immediate that
px + py = v(S ∪ {x, y}) − v(S)
implying
u(S ∪ {x, y}) = u(S).
To summarize,
u(S), u(S ∪ {x, y}) > u(S ∪ {x}), u(S ∪ {y}) (6)
Finally, for any T ⊆ S and E ⊆ {x, y} we have (recall that pd = 0 for all d ∈ S and that v is monotone):
u(T ∪E) = v(T ∪E) − ∑
d∈E pd≤ v(S ∪E) − ∑
d∈E pd= u(S ∪E)
and this together with the inequalities (6) imply that S,S ∪ {x, y} are demanded and any other
demanded bundle must be of the form T or T ∪ {x, y} for T ⊆ S. Thus (NP-SM) is violated, as
required.
We proceed to prove that under the assumption that v satisfies (SM), Conditions (RGP) and
(NP-RGP) are equivalent.
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Assume that (NP-RGP) does not hold, i.e.,there are corresponding non-negative price vector p,
items x, y, z and a bundle S. Then
S ∪ {x}, S ∪ {y, z} ∈Dp(v)
S ∪ {x, z}, S ∪ {x, y}, S ∪ {y}, S ∪ {z} ∉Dp(v)
In particular we have
v(S ∪ {x}) − px + v(S ∪ {y, z}) − py − pz > v(S ∪ {y}) − py + v(S ∪ {x, z}) − px − pz
v(S ∪ {x}) − px + v(S ∪ {y, z}) − py − pz > v(S ∪ {z}) − pz + v(S ∪ {x, y}) − px − py
implying
v(S ∪ {x}) + v(S ∪ {y, z}) > v(S ∪ {y}) + v(S ∪ {x, z}) (7)
v(S ∪ {x}) + v(S ∪ {y, z}) > v(S ∪ {z}) + v(S ∪ {x, y}) (8)
and thus (RGP) is violated as required.
For the converse direction, assume that (7) and (8) hold. We define the prices p as follows. Set
pd =∞ for any d ∉ S ∪ {x, y, z} to guarantee that no item outside of S ∪ {x, y, z} is demanded. By
rearranging the assumed inequalities we get
v(z ∣ S ∪ {y}) > v(z ∣ S ∪ {x}) ≥ 0
v(y ∣ S ∪ {z}) > v(y ∣ S ∪ {x}) ≥ 0
Therefore, by setting py = v(y ∣ S ∪ {z}) −  and pz = v(z ∣ S ∪ {y}) −  for a sufficiently small , py
and pz are positive and
u(S ∪ {y, z}) > u(S ∪ {y}), u{S ∪ {z}} > u(S), (9)
where the first inequality is a direct implication of the definition of py and pz and the second
inequality is implied by the first since v is submodular. Next we define px so that the utility from
S ∪ {x} equals that of S ∪ {y, z}. Specifically:
px = v(S ∪ {x}) − v(S ∪ {y, z}) + py + pz= v(S ∪ {x}) − v(S ∪ {y, z}) + v(S ∪ {y, z}) − v(S ∪ {z}) −  + v(S ∪ {y, z}) − v(S ∪ {y}) − = v(S ∪ {x}) + v(S ∪ {y, z}) − v(S ∪ {z}) − v(S ∪ {y}) − 2> v(S ∪ {y}) + v(S ∪ {x, z}) − v(S ∪ {z}) − v(S ∪ {y}) − 2≥ v(S ∪ {x}) − v(S ∪ {z}) − 2> 0,
where the first inequaity holds by (7), the second holds by monotonicity and the third holds by
(8) and for a small enough . Finally, set pd = 0 for every d ∈ S. Observe that indeed all prices are
nonnegative as required. Next we show that
u(S ∪ {x}) > u(S ∪ {x, y}) (10)
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u(S ∪ {x}) > u(S ∪ {x, z}) (11)
Adding the two inequalites together and applying the submodularity of v gives
u(S ∪ {x}) > u(S ∪ {x, y, z}) (12)
We show that (10) holds ((11) is analogous). This amounts to showing that the marginal
contribution of y to the bundle S ∪ {x} is negative:
v(y∣S ∪ {x}) − py = v(S ∪ {x, y}) − v(S ∪ {x}) − py= v(S ∪ {x, y}) − v(S ∪ {x}) − (v(S ∪ {y, z}) − v(S ∪ {z}) − )= −(v(S ∪ {y, z}) + v(S ∪ {x}) − v(S ∪ {x, y}) − v(S ∪ {z})) + < 0
where the inequality holds by (8) for a sufficiently small  > 0. To summarize, the combination of
(9),(10), (11), (12) together with u(S ∪ {x}) = u(S ∪ {y, z}) establishes that each of
u(S ∪ {x}),
u(S ∪ {y, z})
is strictly greater than each of
u(S),
u(S ∪ {y}),
u(S ∪ {z}),
u(S ∪ {x, z}),
u(S ∪ {x, y}),
u(S ∪ {x, y, z}).
Now, for any T ⊆ S and any E ⊆ {x, y, z} we have (recall that pd = 0 for all d ∈ S)
u(T ∪E) = v(T ∪E) − ∑
d∈E pd≤ v(S ∪E) − ∑
d∈E pd= u(S ∪E)
Therefore, demanded bundles can only be of the form T ∪ {x} or T ∪ {y, z} for T ⊆ S, and
S∪{x}, S∪{y, z} are demanded, implying that (NP-RGP) is violated. This concludes the proof.
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